Lewis Libby pardoned...

[mr2mk1g 10]

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their failure for nondection of 9/11

Leaving asside who's fault what was when etc... I thought it was all public record that 9/11 was actually detected and warnings sent?

[billvon 2,792]

>Connecting the dots has nothing to do with who's reading the
>information, as long as the information is shared.

Well, "who's reading the information" is actually sorta important. If it's some low level analyst in Health and Human Services, all the good intel in the world won't do too much good, at least compared to the same intel making it to the head of Homeland Security (for example.)

And sharing the information is indeed important. Which is why I would be against any new laws preventing said sharing of information.

>I think they are on a witch hunt, driven by the left to avenge their
>failure for nondection of 9/11, etc.

That's a fairly intricate conspiracy theory, one that 1) is unneccesarily complex and 2) credits the democrats with more ability to plan than they are really capable of. I'll have to call Occam's Razor on this one.

[Gawain 0]

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their failure for nondection of 9/11

Leaving asside who's fault what was when etc... I thought it was all public record that 9/11 was actually detected and warnings sent?

Yes, but Billvon's observation that the information was not shared was the issue. That is indeed what happened, and the CIA was not able to share the information and some of it may have been mis-read too.

So I try and I scream and I beg and I sigh
Just to prove I'm alive, and it's alright
'Cause tonight there's a way I'll make light of my treacherous life
Make light!

[Gawain 0]

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>Connecting the dots has nothing to do with who's reading the
>information, as long as the information is shared.

Well, "who's reading the information" is actually sorta important. If it's some low level analyst in Health and Human Services, all the good intel in the world won't do too much good, at least compared to the same intel making it to the head of Homeland Security (for example.)

Granted, but the operative giving the briefings to the executive branch can provide credibility to an analyst's findings based on the level of information handled. Quality can be managed, indeed I think, improved if you take the "personal" touch out of it.

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And sharing the information is indeed important. Which is why I would be against any new laws preventing said sharing of information.

>I think they are on a witch hunt, driven by the left to avenge their
>failure for nondection of 9/11, etc.

That's a fairly intricate conspiracy theory, one that 1) is unneccesarily complex and 2) credits the democrats with more ability to plan than they are really capable of. I'll have to call Occam's Razor on this one.

I didn't mean it as a coordinated conspiracy, but there are a lot of people in the CIA that had to learn the skill of covering their ass in the same manner that President Clinton did during his cut-up of the CIA. In that respect, they followed the imprudent example given by the leadership. The CIA had warned in the 90s that OBL was the greatest threat to us, but it was unanswered. They had to start dodging the axe. Now, their mindset is partial to "no one's going to pin this sh*t on me" mindsets.

So I try and I scream and I beg and I sigh
Just to prove I'm alive, and it's alright
'Cause tonight there's a way I'll make light of my treacherous life
Make light!

[billvon 2,792]

>but there are a lot of people in the CIA that had to learn the skill of
> covering their ass in the same manner that President Clinton did
> during his cut-up of the CIA. In that respect, they followed the
> imprudent example given by the leadership.

I agree; and they are learning it anew with this case. "Cover your ass" has been with us for much longer than this administration (or the previous one.) In my ideal world, people who leak secret information are punished severely, and the people who don't leak the information don't have to cover their asses. We are pretty far from that world right now/

>The CIA had warned in the 90s that OBL was the greatest threat to
> us, but it was unanswered. They had to start dodging the axe. Now,
> their mindset is partial to "no one's going to pin this sh*t on me"'
> mindsets.

They continued with those warnings up until the summer of 2001, and they all went largely unheeded. This is getting away from the topic though.

[SudsyFist 0]

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>that includes concealing source information even from executives . . .

Again, reducing the information available to the executive branch is a bad idea if we want to 'fight terror' and all that. We failed to stop 9/11 because we 'couldn't connect the dots'; our intelligence saw all the pieces but did not see the plan until it was too late. Deciding to cripple our intelligence mechanism further seems like a mistake.

Let me reiterate what Gawain's saying: Consumers of intelligence product neither need nor should have information on sources, period.

Our intelligence mechanism is not at all crippled by sanitizing sources from intelligence product; in fact, *not* sanitizing sources would deliver a crippling blow to our ability to collect intelligence. Every exposure of a source is a potential compromise to our collection capability, as sources are our most valuable intelligence assets.

Consider this hypothetical example: a driver for some high-profile dignitary carries and uses a personal mobile phone whilst on the job. We intercept and DF his comms, allowing us to put together a picture that this dignitary is involved in an arms deal. Now, without sanitization, a report goes out including the fact that information was gathered through mobile phone intercept. Then some asshat leaks the report to the press. Then another asshat runs the story, including the bit about the mobile phone. What happens? Mobile phone goes bye-bye, and we lose a valuable source of intelligence.

Sources are known by appropriate echelons in the analysis chain to evaluate reliability of the data. That evaluation is included with the product to assist commanders and policy-makers in their decision making. They do not need the details on how the information was gathered.

[billvon 2,792]

>Consumers of intelligence product neither need nor should
>have information on sources, period.

I think that would be true if you could draw a clean line between agencies/responsibilities/levels of security. The problem there is such divisions were one of the things cited in the now-famous 'failure to connect the dots'; information was compartmentalized to prevent such leaks, and some important information went unshared. Now, you could argue that it's possible to do that with completely sanitized information, but there's no such thing.

Take your example. Let's say agency A knows the diplomat is involved in the arms deal. They may well not want to reveal this to agency B yet because they want the diplomat unmolested until he reveals his source, for the same reasons you list above (not blowing the source.) However, ageny B may be working on something similar, and they know some chemical weapons are about to change hands in the area. By the time they finally decide to get their stories together, the deal has happened, and a few tons of Sarin have gone missing.

So while I agree that it is important to 'sanitize' sources, I would be very hesitant to increase the level of that sanitization beyond what we have now; what we have now has had problems in the past. I think a stronger lesson here is that security clearances have to be taken VERY seriously.

[SudsyFist 0]

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>Consumers of intelligence product neither need nor should
>have information on sources, period.

I think that would be true if you could draw a clean line between agencies/responsibilities/levels of security. The problem there is such divisions were one of the things cited in the now-famous 'failure to connect the dots'; information was compartmentalized to prevent such leaks, and some important information went unshared. Now, you could argue that it's possible to do that with completely sanitized information, but there's no such thing.

As the community grows, there will be more issues that need to be worked out with regard to sharing of information, joint ops, etc. Those are growing pains. But your statement doesn't apply to the sources, themselves.

I think we've got differing definitions of the word, "source." I'm using it to refer to the method and details by which the data was actually collected (voice intercept, interrogation, imagery, contacts, etc.). That's what I'm saying needs to be protected at all costs.

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Take your example.

Your expounding has to deal with the sharing of intelligence product, not the source (by my definition above). Given current procedure, the diplomat would definitely be identified in reports and cross-referenced with operations in other agencies. Whether this is done in a timely manner is another story, based on product volume, prioritization and other factors at that particular time.

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So while I agree that it is important to 'sanitize' sources, I would be very hesitant to increase the level of that sanitization beyond what we have now; what we have now has had problems in the past.

I think what we have in place regarding sanitization works quite well. The problems we've been facing over the last twenty years or so are mostly dealing the skyrocketing amount of data we're collecting, thanks largely to technology and automation. Sifting through the noise alone is a huge bottleneck from which we'll be working out kinks for many years to come.

Another big issue, however, is the growing need for more seamless inter-agency cooperation, 9/11 being the most prominent evidence of such. Steps have been taken (establishment of an NID, etc.) to address this issue, but it'll take time to see whether they're effective.

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I think a stronger lesson here is that security clearances have to be taken VERY seriously.

Fortunately, intelligence professionals do take it seriously, for the most part. Most of the problems with leaks lie within the stakeholder organizations themselves, where attitudes regarding intelligence are different than those of the people whose every day job it is. It's these stakeholders who really need to get their acts together with regard to classified and leaks. I'm just glad they can't forfeit the invaluable information (sources), due to its being redacted before they even see it.