Court takes a stand against frivolous pro se lawsuits

[brierebecca 0]

This opinion is hilarious. As a former law clerk in the US Attorney's office (on whose desk most of these pro se complaints landed), I feel vindicated.

934 F.Supp. 1395
934 F.Supp. 1395
(Cite as: 934 F.Supp. 1395)


United States District Court,
S.D. Georgia,
Statesboro Division.
Matthew WASHINGTON, Plaintiff,
v.
A.A. ALAIMO, Judge; Avant Edenfield, Chief Judge; Dudley H. Bowen, Jr.,
Judge; William T. Moore, Jr., Judge; W. Owens, Judge; James E. Graham,
Magistrate Judge; C.W. Hicks, Jr., Magistrate Judge, Defendants.
Civil Action No. CV695-104.

May 17, 1996.

*1396 Matthew Washington, pro se.

No attorneys for defendants--parties never served with complaint or summons.

ORDER

WILLIAM T. MOORE, Jr., District Judge.

[1] On April 5, 1996, this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this
Court should not impose Rule 11 sanctions upon him for filing a motion for
improper purposes. The motion which Plaintiff filed was entitled "Motion to
Kiss My Ass" (Doc. 107) in which he moved "all Americans at large and one
corrupt Judge Smith [to] kiss my got [sic] damn ass sorry mother fucker you."
This Court gave Plaintiff until April 25, 1996, to respond and specifically
warned: "Failure to comply with this Order will result in dismissal of this
case." Plaintiff has appealed the show-cause order to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. As the April 5 Order was not a
final order, Plaintiff's appeal is an interlocutory appeal and, as such, this
Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and matters in this case. 28
U.S.C.

1292(b). As of the date indicated below, Plaintiff has not
responded to the show-cause order. Therefore, this Court DISMISSES WITH
PREJUDICE the above-captioned case for Plaintiff's complete disregard of and
noncompliance with an explicit court order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); Local Rule
41.1(b); see Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir.1985) (holding that
district court's power to dismiss action under Rule 41(b) for failure to obey
court order is inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its orders). All
outstanding motions are hereby rendered MOOT.

[2] This Court also observes that this is not the first instance in which
Plaintiff has abused the civil right forum of this Court provided through 42
U.S.C.

1983 and finds that certain restrictions, as outlined below,
need to be placed upon prospective lawsuits initiated by Plaintiff in order to
protect parties from abusive litigation and to protect the federal judiciary's
integrity of purpose.

On March 20, 1976, Plaintiff walked into a Savannah sporting goods store and
paid $149 for a 12 gauge shotgun. The next day, five Chatham County Police
officers responded to a complaint from a woman on Stuyvesant street. She
stated that she was afraid to sit on her back porch because someone was
shooting a gun. The police officers investigated the incident and found the
source of the trouble to be Plaintiff, who initially confronted the officers
while on his front porch. Plaintiff then ran into his house. Two of the
officers pursued him through the front door while the other three entered his
house through the back door. Plaintiff could not be seen in the house and
the officers began searching for him. One officer, J. Waters, happened upon
a closet and soon thereafter *1397 saw the end of a shotgun barrel coming out
of the darkness of the closet. Officer Waters warned the others to get back
and the shotgun fired. Buckshot pellets hit Officer Waters in the head and
Officer J.R. McNeely in the left hand. Plaintiff fired the gun again and the
second shot hit Officer Alex Hodgson in the chest; Officer Hodgson died from
the injuries sustained. Plaintiff, who had previously been acquitted of
another murder charge by reason of insanity, was arrested sometime that day. (
See SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, March 22, 1976, p. 1B.)

Plaintiff was convicted for the murder of Officer Hodgson and for three
counts of aggravated assault. On January 24, 1977, the Superior Court of
Chatham County (Cheatham, J.) sentenced Plaintiff to life imprisonment for the
murder conviction (Chatham Co. Indictment No. 25162), ten years for the
aggravated assault of Pat Howard (Chatham Co. Indictment No. 25163), ten years
for the aggravated assault of Waters (Chatham Co. Indictment No. 25164), and
ten years for the aggravated assault of McNeely (Chatham Co. Indictment No.
25165); the sentences were set to run consecutively. The Georgia State
Department of Corrections committed Plaintiff to Georgia State Prison in
Reidsville where he is currently serving his sentence.

Since his commitment to the state prison system, Plaintiff has become a
frequent litigant within the federal courts seeking relief through the
auspices of 42 U.S.C.

1983. The Clerk of Court for the Superior
Court of Chatham County has also informed this Court that Plaintiff is
frequently suing for various forms of relief through the state court system as
well. What distinguishes Plaintiff from most prisoner litigants in federal
courts is that he pays his filing fee rather than submit an application to
proceed in forma pauperis under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

1915.
It has come to the attention of this Court that Plaintiff's litigation
practice is largely, if not entirely, underwritten by the Federal Treasury as
he periodically receives a substantial check for veterans' disability
benefits. By paying his filing fee, Plaintiff has thus far avoided the
filter of the 28 U.S.C.

1915(d) frivolity review. As a result,
patently frivolous lawsuits have languished in this district longer than would
otherwise be warranted with other prisoner litigants.

Plaintiff has shown in his dealings with the courts in this District that he
lacks the ability or will to govern his suits with the civility and order
required by the Local Rules and by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He
has wasted the time of many an innocent party and he has flippantly used the
resources of the judiciary with his abusive motions filing practice.

In Matthew Washington v. Bobby Whitworth, et al., 6:91cv87, this Court's
experience with Plaintiff began. In that case, Plaintiff filed the Complaint
on November 8, 1991, and soon commenced his motion filings practice. In
February 1992, he moved to change venue. Then, he initiated the trademark of
his practice: the Motion to Amend Complaint. He moved to amend his
complaint on March 6, 1992, on April 15, 1992, and on December 14, 1992.
After a couple allowances of amendment, Judge Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., began
denying Plaintiff's motions to amend. Soon thereafter he moved to disqualify
Judge Bowen and began filing "Extraordinary Motions to Amend" including one
which desired to add the United States Secret Service as a party.

Plaintiff began filing frivolous motions on a weekly basis and, in that
relatively simple civil rights lawsuit, he ended up filing more than
seventy-five pleadings, all of which required the considered attention of this
Court and Judge Bowen. These motions included "Motion to Behoove an
Inquisition" and "Motion for Judex Delegatus" and "Motion for Restoration of
Sanity" and "Motion for Deinstitutionalization". In one instance, he
indicated the recreational tilt of his litigation when he filed a "Motion for
Publicity" regarding a trial which had been set for March 23, 1995, in
Statesboro. At the time of trial, Plaintiff filed a "Motion to Vacate
Jurisdiction" which was denied. Even after judgment as a matter of law was
entered against him at the trial, Plaintiff did not perceive his case as
complete. He renewed the filing of "Extraordinary Motions to Amend" and
filed his appeals, fees paid, with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.

*1398 After one year of motions filing after the case had been closed, this
Court ordered Plaintiff to quit submitting motions in a closed case and
directed the Clerk to return to Plaintiff any further pleading filed by him.
Plaintiff "one-upped" the Clerk when he filed a Notice of Appeal from that
order; the notice, of course, had to be placed in the case file.

In Matthew Washington v. James T. Morris, et al., 4:93cv114, Plaintiff set
out to sue a host of individuals, including the Superior Court judge who
presided over his the Hodgson murder trial and the attorney who defended him
in that trial. Plaintiff filed the complaint on May 20, 1993, and sought to
amend it on June 7, 1993, July 21, 1993, July 23, 1993, November 2, 1993,
November 5, 1993, December 14, 1993, December 22, 1993, January 23, 1995,
March 2, 1995, March 29, 1995, and on October 20, 1995. At least one of
these Motions to Amend sought to add Magistrate Judge James E. Graham as a
party defendant. Plaintiff filed fifty-four pleadings in that case, all of
which required the considered attention of Judge Anthony A. Alaimo or
Magistrate Graham. The motions ranged from the mundane, such as "Motion for
Change of Venue", to the arcane, such as "Motion for Cesset pro Cessus" and
"Motion for Judex Delegatus", to the curious, such as "Motion for Nunc pro
Tunc" and "Motion for Psychoanalysis", to the outlandish, such as "Motion to
Impeach Judge Alaimo" and "Motion to Renounce Citizenship" and "Motion to
Exhume Body of Alex Hodgson". Plaintiff also filed numerous interlocutory
appeals, which required the attention and utilization of the resources of the
Court of Appeals. The case was disposed of on the pleadings in Defendants'
favor. Plaintiff has filed an appeal.

Plaintiff's other cases in this district demonstrate that his litigation
practice continues with the same themes as described above. In Matthew
Washington v. Dr. Joseph H. Owens, Jr., 6:94cv39, Plaintiff filed some ten
motions to amend, moved to disqualify the undersigned judge, and also
expressed his contempt for the undersigned judge by filing a "Motion to Invoke
and Execute Rule 15--Retroactive Note: The Court's School Days are Over".
This Court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint upon motion by the Defendant. The
case currently is on appeal. In Matthew Washington v. Ronald Fountain, et
al., 6:94cv120, Plaintiff has already filed thirteen motions to amend,
including one which sought to add President Clinton as a party. Plaintiff
also sought to disqualify the undersigned judge and again invoked the
mysterious "Rule 15". The case has been reassigned to Chief Judge B. Avant
Edenfield and is still pending.

In the instant case, Plaintiff has sued all of the judges and one magistrate
judge from this District as well as one judge and one magistrate judge from
the Middle District of Georgia. Plaintiff also unsuccessfully tried to join
Judge Michael Karpf of the Superior Court of Chatham County and United States
Senator Sam Nunn. His five motions to amend are overshadowed by the "Motion
to Kiss My Ass" which Plaintiff filed (apparently to express his frustration
with Magistrate Judge G.R. Smith's refusal to allow the addition of Judge
Karpf and Senator Nunn). This case has been pending less than one year and
already Plaintiff has filed three interlocutory appeals. Likewise, in
Matthew Washington v. R.D. Collins, et al., 6:95cv113, Plaintiff has already
filed three frivolous interlocutory appeals in a case which is only several
months old. [FN1]

FN1. Most of Plaintiff's appeals to the Eleventh Circuit are dismissed
for either lack of jurisdiction or for lack of brief in support of
appeal.

In Matthew Washington v. Dr. Joseph H. Owens, 6:95cv214, Plaintiff has filed
a "Motion for Skin Change Operation" in which he desired the government to
fund a sex change for him. When Magistrate Judge W. Leon Barfield denied the
motion, Plaintiff filed a "Motion to Impeach" the magistrate. He also
unsuccessfully sought to add the undersigned judge as a party defendant.

In another case which had been originally filed in the Northern District of
Georgia, 6:96cv54, Plaintiff sued the same judges as in this case and also
added Ted Turner of CNN International for good measure: "Mr. Turner,*1399 a
fellow Georgian, is and has violated the 'Free Press' of which he 'supposedly
stands' with his cartel and CBS endeavors to do the same." Recently, he
filed a "Motion for Catered Food Services" in which he complained about the
prison food and moved for a court order allowing him to "receive catered food
from some credible responsible business establishment preferred and paid for
by Plaintiff."

These are just some examples from some of Plaintiff's recent litigation
adventures. Prior to this decade, Plaintiff had a long history of litigation
within this District. His recreational litigation has gone on for entirely
too long and at great expense to the American taxpayer. Too many resources
have been wasted and too many innocent people harassed. This Court now
considers what discretion it has to prevent the future waste of judicial
resources.

The appellate courts have upheld orders which limited a pro se plaintiff's
access to the courts. See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d
Cir.1984) (holding that "[f]ederal courts have both the inherent power and
constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which
impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions"); Peck v. Hoff, 660
F.2d 371 (8th Cir.1981); Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.1981). The
Supreme Court has clearly recognized the validity of these judicially ordered
curbs on abusive litigation. See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 n. 8, 109
S.Ct. 993, 996 n. 8, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989). This circuit has also
recognized the power of district courts to strictly control the access which
abusive litigants have to judicial resources. See Martin-Trigona v. Shaw,
986 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir.1993 ) (per curiam); Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390
(11th Cir.1991) (per curiam); Cofield v. Alabama Public Service Commission,
936 F.2d 512 (11th Cir.1991); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th
Cir.1986) (en banc) (per curiam).

In Procup, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, considered a district court
injunction which banned an abusive prisoner litigant from filing any case
unless it was submitted by an attorney admitted before the court. 792 F.2d at
1070. The Court reversed the district court's injunction but established
that district courts' have considerable discretion in restricting an abusive
litigant's access to the federal judiciary: "We hold that the district
court's injunction was overbroad, but that the district court has authority to
impose serious restrictions on Procup's bringing matters before the court
without an attorney." Id. In so ruling, the Court observed:
Occasionally, a particularly abusive prisoner, taking advantage of his unique
situation, will come along with a flood of claims designed to either harass
those in positions of authority or to grind the wheels of the judicial system
to a halt.... Every lawsuit filed, no matter how frivolous or repetitious,
requires the investment of court time, whether the complaint is reviewed
initially by a law clerk, a staff attorney, a magistrate, or the judge.
Id. at 1072.

The Procup court, however, reversed the injunction because it found that the
attorney-submission requirement could well have the effect of completely
foreclosing the plaintiff's access to the courts. Id. at 1071. The court
noted that, realistically, the plaintiff would have a difficult time obtaining
an attorney for even a meritorious claim: "A private attorney, knowing
Procup's track record, might well be unwilling to devote the time and effort
necessary to sift through Procup's generally frivolous claims to see if there
is one of sufficient merit to undertake legal representation. A legitimate
claim could well go undiscovered." Id. This understandable reluctance on the
part of attorneys of the local bar would then amount to a closing of the
courthouse door for Procup and, de facto, his access to the courts would be
denied. Id. "An absolute bar against a prisoner filing any suit in federal
court would be patently unconstitutional." Id.

The court simply ruled that the district court had the correct intentions of
curtailing the plaintiff's activity but had acted too zealously to the
detriment of the plaintiff's constitutional rights: "This does not mean that
the district court was incorrect in employing injunctive relief. The
district court was fully justified and within its authority in entering *1400
injunctive restrictions against Procup. Such action is necessary and prudent
to protect the rights of all litigants in the federal system." Id.

The Procup court further expressed its strong approval of strong litigation
restrictions by stating: "There should be little doubt that the district
court has the jurisdiction to protect itself against the abuses that litigants
like Procup visit upon it." Id. at 1073. Further, a "court has a
responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on
the judicial machinery needed by others." Id.

Indeed, though the Procup court actually reversed the district court
injunction, the great weight of the opinion was spent apologizing for the
reversal and explaining that district courts may do many things to curtail
frivolous litigants except close the courthouse door: "Considerable
discretion necessarily is reposed in the district court. Procup can be
severely restricted as to what he may file and how he must behave in his
applications for judicial relief. He just cannot be completely foreclosed
from any access to the court." Id. (emphasis in original).

This Court finds that Plaintiff has abused the judiciary and that his abuse
has lingered longer than would otherwise be tolerated from normal prisoner
plaintiffs because of Plaintiff's status as a pay-to-play litigant. The time
has come to take the rattle from the baby and impose some form and discipline
upon Plaintiff's law practice within this and other federal courts.

Accordingly, this Court hereby ENJOINS Plaintiff from filing a lawsuit in
this or any other federal district court unless the following conditions are
met:
1. In addition to paying the $120.00 filing fee which Plaintiff has already
demonstrated the ability to pay, Plaintiff must post a $1,500.00 contempt
bond with the Clerk of Court. [FN2] This bond will be held by the Clerk of
Court and, if Plaintiff has conducted the affairs in his case appropriately
within the realm of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the bond will be
returned to Plaintiff at the conclusion of his case. [FN3]

FN2. This Court bases this figure on the knowledge that Plaintiff
periodically receives a large disability check from the United States
Treasury. On May 14, 1996, Plaintiff had an inmate account balance of
$17,017.80. This amount included funds from a May 2, 1996, $14,772.00
check and a May 6, 1996, $1,870.00 check from the United States
Treasury. Plaintiff may move this Court to alter the bond requirement if
his disability checks permanently cease.

FN3. This provision is created to ensure that Plaintiff will not act as
he has in the instant case in which he harshly abused several members of
the Court and the American taxpayers (who have completely funded his
litigious exploits) and then fail to respond to a Rule 11 show-cause
order.

2. A signed affidavit shall accompany his complaint in which Plaintiff swears
that he has read Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and that he will abide by
the tenets listed therein.
3. A photocopy of this Order shall be attached to his complaint.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to return any complaint from Plaintiff not in
compliance with this Order. [FN4] If Plaintiff has complied with the three
items above, the Clerk is DIRECTED to accept the filing fee and contempt bond
and then submit the complaint, prior to filing, to the judge who will be
assigned the case. The judge or magistrate judge will then conduct a
frivolity review just as if the case were filed under 28 U.S.C.

1915
. If the judicial officer determines that the complaint is not frivolous,
malicious, or intended to harass, then the judicial officer will allow the
case to be filed and service to issue against the named defendants. [FN5]

FN4. The Clerk recently received from Plaintiff an application for
judicial action under 42 U.S.C.

1983 (application # ST 96-78).
The Clerk will return that document to Plaintiff along with a
photocopy of this Order.

FN5. This Court observes that this requirement will soon be levied upon
all prisoner litigants, regardless of in forma pauperis status, through
the Prison Litigation Reform Act which President Clinton signed into law
on April 26, 1996, as part of the omnibus FY 1996 appropriations
measure.

This Court is quite sure that, if the villagers who heard the boy cry "wolf"
one time too many had some form of reassurance that the boy's last cry was
sincere, they would *1401 have responded appropriately and he would be alive
instead of being dinner for the ravenous canine. If anything, that story
teaches that repetitious tomfoolery can result in disaster for the knave.
This Court will not turn a deaf ear to Plaintiff's future cries. However, it
will require Plaintiff to structure his pleas for help in a more sincere
manner so that the energies of the villagers are not wasted on the repeated
runs up the grassy hill atop which the mischievous boy sits laughing.

SO ORDERED.

END OF DOCUMENT

Thoughts?

Brie

"Ive seen you hump air, hump the floor of the plane, and hump legs. You now have a new nickname: "Black Humper of Death"--yardhippie

[beowulf 1]

I am sorry but I lost interest about a fourth of the way through that. It's just too long.

[Andy9o8 0]

Please see E-mail (not PM) sent to your dz.com box.

[brierebecca 0]

Quote

Please see E-mail (not PM) sent to your dz.com box.

I can't check that email - it's down this morning for some reason. PM would be better.

Brie

"Ive seen you hump air, hump the floor of the plane, and hump legs. You now have a new nickname: "Black Humper of Death"--yardhippie

[ExAFO 0]

Heh. I love it when usually stuffy judges drop the non-pretentious hammer on some idiot.

Illinois needs a CCW Law. NOW.

[brierebecca 0]

Quote

I am sorry but I lost interest about a fourth of the way through that. It's just too long.

I'm sorry you didn't find it entertaining. I thought it was great.

Brie

"Ive seen you hump air, hump the floor of the plane, and hump legs. You now have a new nickname: "Black Humper of Death"--yardhippie

[brierebecca 0]

Quote

I plan on nuking Blackacre. That place pisses me off.

This sig line is freakin hilarious. Just wait till you get to Gratuitous Transfers, buddy. You'll wish you'd never heard of the place.

Brie

"Ive seen you hump air, hump the floor of the plane, and hump legs. You now have a new nickname: "Black Humper of Death"--yardhippie

[Andy9o8 0]

FWIW, frivolous court filings by incarcerated prisoners are not all that uncommon, and increasingly the remedy is similar as here - they get ordered to restrict their filings, such that no filing will be permitted unless it is first vetted and approved in advance by the court or its designee.