sacex250

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Posts posted by sacex250


  1. Quote

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    I think this is the case at many DZs. I think there should be a clear written policy posted where everyone that rents gear can see it. I fail to see why a business owner would leave something so potentially expensive in a gray area. In my opinion though a lot of DZOs seem to have the "everything is cool and no big deal" attitude till the shit hits the fan.

    My gear is insured, I don't know why a DZO wouldn't do the same.



    That's what the "rental fee" should be for. By my calculations, I've spent $1125 in rental fees since I started skydiving in July. I haven't had to cut away so far, and I hope to make many more jumps before I do. Now you watch, on my next jump my canopy will explode or something and I'll need one...

    Most of the time when they do have cutaways they recover the canopy. But you know, sometimes shit happens and they cant find it.

    If they're getting bent out of shape due to a lost canopy, they're probably not charging enough in rental fees. They're running a business, they should be charging enough to cover expenses and grow their business. Having people get injured or killed because they were afraid to chop when they should have is not good for business.



    Exactly. The DZO is responsible for normal, anticipated use of the rig; it's legally considered the "cost of doing business" even if it's in the waiver that the renter is responsible for loss or damage. The DZO would lose the case in small claims court, so make him go through the trouble of suing if he's being that big of a knob about it.

    On the other hand, when a jumper who just cutaway lands and starts looking for high-fives while he's jumping up and down with glee because he just had a cutaway then he isn't going to get a lot of sympathy from the DZO while the canopy flies away. It's probably a good idea to show some immediate concern for recovering the canopy and minimizing the DZO's liability.
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

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    My post was about uncontrolled airspace, what part of what I said did you not understand?

    Akers said notification was necessary in uncontrolled airspace, I said it wasn't. Why are you arguing about controlled airspace?



    Good grief. I'm not arguing about anything. I was simply trying to point out that it's only "not necessary" because in most (all?) cases, it's not possible to fly a load of jumpers and remain within Class G (uncontrolled) airspace the entire time. ;)



    Static line 'em!!!!
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

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    What did I miss? Unless something has changed, the pilot still has an ATC notification requirement in uncontrolled airspace before dropping jumpers.


    You missed the part in Part 105 that says notification only needs to be made if jumping in or into controlled airspace. Jumps made in Class G (uncontrolled) airspace don't require ATC notification.
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

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    3 things:

    - the players seemed to all notice
    - the bets increased and so did the frequency of winnings
    - players know the order of a deck of cards, and so should any good dealer...

    Given these 3 facts, it's not especially reassuring that the dealer didn't notice, or didn't notice sooner...


    Does the dealer actually get to see all the cards?

    Interesting side note here: when did the mafia start settling scores by suing people who rip them off?
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

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    too many to list, but...

    I hope I am never furthest away from the door when we are low, and the pilot gives the instruction to bail.

    imagine you got two perfectly good parachutes on your back and the plane is passing through 2K, descending rapidly, and you still got 10+ bodies in front of you, with everyone hesitating in the door.


    Having to bail out of said airplane but logjammed in the door because some guy ten spots back won't stop trying to shove his way through while yelling GTFO OF MY WAY, YOU MAGGOTS!
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

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    Anybody on the forums have experience with large scale (military or commercial) parachute drying towers that can give me some pointers in private messages?



    Bring lots of quarters and don't forget the Bounce.
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

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    The problem was that there was a pilot who wasn't trained on what to do if the computers aren't working.



    I don't believe that. Just because pilots don't do something correctly doesn't mean they never got the training, albeit likely not enough of the training taken seriously.

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    Such a situation is king of like the Gimli Glider - a new glass cockpit 767 that did the work for you. The system measured fuel usage and was so reliable that nobody even bothered to flight test the performance of the plane if it ran dry of fuel. Solid piloting helped make a serious screw-up a non-casualty event.



    For that event it was only the flight management computer that was measuring fuel usage from a starting fuel load that was input manually (in the wrong units of course). The fuel quantity indication system was inoperative because it was in fact not reliable (accurate) enough at the time of the introduction of the 767 to service. That's right, fuel quantity gauges were not part of the minimum equipment list.



    The fuel quantity system was part of the minimum equipment list, but was inadvertently left inoperative by a maintenance worker who was working on the system. The flight crew decided to continue the flight because they thought that maintenance had authorized the flight.

    The real problem however was that an incorrect mathematical conversion between metric and imperial units meant that the plane was carrying 22,300 lbs. of fuel (10,115 kg) instead of the 22,300 kg of fuel it needed, less than half.
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

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    If you start giving pilots a way to shut off safety systems then, you know what, they will! Remember the Northwest DC-9 crash in Detroit where the pilots shut off the flap/throttle configuration alarms and then proceeded to takeoff without the flaps set? At least one little girl survived the crash.



    Which is why it would need to be more than just pushing a button. If you have to puch a button, then gournd the AC and call MX to come in and re-set the 'easy' button, then go through a review with upper management where you explain to them why you pushed the button, pilots are going to be far less likely to push the botton unless they really need it.

    That's why I likened it to declaring an emergency. It's a big pain in the ass for a ton of people when a pilot declares an emergency (we're talking airlines here). Every single time an emergency was declared, it wasn't declared at the first hint of a problem, it was after the pilots checked the book, called HQ for a work-around or solution, and then figured out they need to declare an emergency.

    The 'easy' button would be the same. Always there, always available, but a last resort.



    Your "Easy Button" wouldn't have done anything to prevent the crash of the A320, can you name an actual crash where it would have helped?

    Declaring an emergency isn't nearly the big deal that you think it is. Your characterization of it is a bit overly dramatic, really, "call HQ first"? It's the emergency itself that gets investigated, whether or not an emergency is ever declared.
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

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    What you're describing is exactly what brought down Air France 447. The computers lost the ability to control the airplane when the pitot tubes iced over, so the computers gave full control to the pilots. The problem was the first officer didn't realize that the flight computers weren't providing stall protection anymore, so he just kept pulling back on the stick instead of nosing over to recover from the stall that he was causing.

    Thanks for the great example of automation confusion. :)


    I think it's a great example of pilot incompetence. The other pilot understood what configuration the aircraft was in, what he couldn't figure out was why the airplane was stalled. He didn't know that the incompetent first officer was the one causing the stall. If an airplane is shouting STALL, STALL, STALL at you in a loud clear cockpit voice, it should be pretty apparent that the person flying the plane should be dropping the nose, unfortunately, the first officer was a moron.
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

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    What you're describing is exactly what brought down Air France 447. The computers lost the ability to control the airplane when the pitot tubes iced over, so the computers gave full control to the pilots



    No, that's different. What I described was a system where the pilots would have to enable the switch from automation to full manual. That step is critical in that is ensures the pilots know the current configuration of the AC.

    If the automation shuts itself off, even with a light or chime to indicate the switch, there's no guarantee that the pilots will pick up on that. You have to figure that the shit is hitting the fan is the computers give up, so there's a chance that the pilots might not see the indication of the change.

    If the pilot has to take action to make it happen, there's no chance that they'll be uninformed.



    That's like saying that if a Ferrari driver turns off the traction control then there's no way he'll spin out and wrap it around a telephone pole.

    If you start giving pilots a way to shut off safety systems then, you know what, they will! Remember the Northwest DC-9 crash in Detroit where the pilots shut off the flap/throttle configuration alarms and then proceeded to takeoff without the flaps set? At least one little girl survived the crash.

    In the A320 crash, the computers did nothing to cause the crash, they performed exactly as they should have. It was how the airplane was flown by the pilots that caused the crash.

    If the same maneuver had been flown in a 737, the pilots would have had a stick shaker to warn them that they were flying too slow, and if they continued to fly slower, the stick pusher would have fired to force the nose down to prevent a stall although it also would have caused them to crash to the runway.

    The 737 pilots would have had more incentive to avoid a stall by not flying slow. The A320 pilots weren't afraid of stalling, so they used up all their available control authority flying slow, but then they had nothing left when they tried to climb.
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

  11. What you're describing is exactly what brought down Air France 447. The computers lost the ability to control the airplane when the pitot tubes iced over, so the computers gave full control to the pilots. The problem was the first officer didn't realize that the flight computers weren't providing stall protection anymore, so he just kept pulling back on the stick instead of nosing over to recover from the stall that he was causing.
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

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    The computers weren't to blame in that crash, it was pilot error/stupidity.

    The industry term I've read is "automation confusion". Sure, the pilots did something the computer didn't want and lost the argument. My position is that planes should be simple to fly, not complex. The computer systems on the Airbus aircraft are like very unsafe crew members: they operate very autonomously and are uncommunicative. That is something to be avoided on the flight deck (or air traffic control room, for that matter.)

    On a Boeing aircraft, when on autopilot, the yoke and trim wheels still move as the autopilot does it's job. The pilots can tell what's going on just by watching the movements. When they take the controls manually, they have feedback in the form of "feel" of control pressures.

    In the Airbus, trim and control surface movements go unnoticed on autopilot. When the pilots start flying the aircraft, the only feedback is the spring load in the joystick, exactly like a video game. The two sticks move independently, so the pilots can make contradictory inputs. I believe from there the computer either ignores one stick or uses an averaging algorithm, possibly depending on the mode.

    Would you like a parachute system that, if you had a canopy collision at 1000', would say "NO, you're in the landing mode. You are not allowed to cutaway and pull your reserve!"? When the shit hits the fan, I don't want to be scanning the screen for software prompts. ;)


    The pilots put the airplane into a situation which required the airplane to accelerate before it could climb, since A320's don't have afterburners there wasn't enough time for the plane to accelerate and climb above the trees. The flight computers kept the pilots from stalling the plane which would have been the likely result of such a foolish stunt with a non-fly-by-wire aircraft.

    The pilot was flying the airplane the same way that the Blue Angel solo pilots do during the "Section High Alpha Pass," which is to level off and attain maximum angle of attack to fly at minimum speed. There are only three ways to recover from this situation:

    A) drop the nose to accelerate (like a stall recovery),
    B) add power to accelerate the airplane so that the AOA can be reduced, or
    C) hit the afterburners and unload the wings with engine thrust.

    Option A is not available during a low pass, option C is never available to an Airbus, and there wasn't enough time for option B to work before the airplane flew into the trees.

    Here's a video of the Blue Angel solo pilots demonstrating options B and C.

    High Alpha Pass
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.

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    So, Mr Mitchell, Boeing all the way? ;-)

    Hell yeah! That was the pilots' fault, not the plane. The plane held together and everybody lived. That's a good landing. A great landing is when you can use the plane again.

    Here's what happens when you let computers control the plane.

    Warning: it's not pretty. [:/]

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KEH7OpnA-I4



    The computers weren't to blame in that crash, it was pilot error/stupidity.
    It's all been said before, no sense repeating it here.