buzzer

None of can know what exactly happened. But here is a thought that adds on to other posts. The engine quits, and the only reasonable spot you see is the beach. You head for it while doing a number of other things...trying to restart, making a mayday call, checking your airspeed, talking to passenger about getting ready for a crash landing along with swearing. As you get near and are committed you see some people but you think they will surely hear you coming in and get out of your way. It's too late to do anything by the time you realize they are not going to get out of your way.

Dating myself perhaps but what happened to the DZ off Fredrick Firestone exit? It was a 182 DZ years ago.

Don't know if this has been posted but though members should know. This was in the news. LOS ANGELES – The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing a $664,000 civil penalty against William C. Dause, doing business as The Parachute Center of Acampo, Calif., for allegedly failing to perform required aircraft parts replacements and failing to comply with safety directives. “Putting parachutists at risk by neglecting to follow safety procedures is unacceptable,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary LaHood. “We expect aircraft operators to comply with our safety rules and will take enforcement action when they do not.” The FAA alleges that The Parachute Center operated a DeHavilland DHC-6 Twin Otter when critical parts were well past their life limits and without inspecting portions of the wings for corrosion. In all, the FAA alleges that The Parachute Center operated the aircraft on approximately 2,121 flights between March 21, 2008 and Nov. 4, 2009 with elevator control cables that were overdue for replacement and when the plane was not in compliance with Airworthiness Directives requiring visual inspections of the wing main spar, lower spar cap extensions and wing support strut for possible corrosion. The FAA also alleges that the company operated the aircraft on at least 500 flights between April 16, 2009 and Nov. 4, 2009 with aileron control cables that were overdue for replacement. “Passengers and crew have to be able to trust that an operator has done the right thing and has complied with all the rules,” said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. “Safety and compliance are the right choices, every time.” The Parachute Center has 30 days from receipt of the FAA’s enforcement letter to respond to the agency.

ATP 16,000+ Singles, Twins, King Air, Otter, Boeings, Airbus No airplane is perfect...I'd like to think of them all as something to jump out of!

Biggest turn off was the jump staff who it seemed could care less about new jumpers. Watched many tandem jumpers unattended when they should have been looked after. Sad that one item like that can leave a bad vibe. I didn't require hand holding so that was just an observation. The place visually has great texture and feel to it. The bar being there is cool. Manifesters were very nice...esp Amanda. Landing area is OK but a little small for newer jumpers who might find off DZ landings hazardous. Views of the Ocean are great. Facilities are plenty good enough (perhaps dated though) with showers, place to park motor home etc. Main building too small on the weekends but perfect for the week. Lots of small airplane traffic but didn't notice any that got in the way. A diverse group of visitors makes for good conversations if you want to chat.

Thanks Howard. Note: There is an email address to respond to these recommendations at the end of each one.

Both were -20's from the NTSB info. As has been mentioned, given engine, atmospheric conditions, weight etc. we don't know for sure that the airplane would have been able to keep flying with perfect flying skill. However, the NTSB says the plane reached perhaps 150' which is out of ground effect. When you lose an engine down low, you have your hands full.

Daniel, Yes I think they did say that, but also said the amount of data was too small to make any certain comparison. IMO, the death rate isn't bad. The NTSB just found they haven't looked at jump operations in some time and needed to look again. Their interest is to suggest ways to decrease fatalities, no matter how safe it may already be.

Skydived, Vmc is 83kts with flaps up, slower with flaps out at max gross at sea level on standard temp. day. More on this is better suited to another thread but having extra speed like you suggest can be a good or bad thing depending on conditions. NoshitthereIwas, V1 and V2 are used when flying jets and are not applied in general in this type of operation/airplane. No matter what series engine, the airplane should have been able to keep a climb with one engine out and at max weight using the proper procedure. Yes, the higher powered models would help more. In the accident airplane, we know it was under max weight but we don't know that the good engine was developing full power due to age/wear. It could be a contributing factor but the fact that the pilot stalled the airplane is the primary reason for the fatalities. There are likely other contributing factors. I won't claim to be an expert. I have read the NTSB report. Although I have many hours, I don't have many in the Twin Otter.

Daniel, I don't know anything about the pilot of that airplane. Even an experienced pilot needs to review and practice emergency procedures. When it's something you may only do one or several times in your life...all the normal flying you do doesn't help much to keep you ready for an emergency. Keeping up on those skills is left completely up to the pilot for jump ops under current rules. But when can you just go take the jump plane up and burn fuel to practice? Having some rules that requires you to practice and/or demonstrate proficiency would help much in this area...for all pilots.

Some more info. Engine: Microscopic examination of the right engine’s fractured compressor turbine blades revealed features consistent with overload. Additional damage was observed in engine sections beyond the compressor turbine section along the engine’s gas path. Also, several of the right engine’s compressor turbine blade tips were missing. The overload fractures on the blades in the compressor turbine section and the damage beyond that section were consistent with mechanical damage caused by separated compressor turbine blade tips migrating within the engine. Because no preimpact anomalies were observed in engine areas forward of the damaged compressor turbine along the engine’s gas path, there is no evidence that an ingested object, such as a bird or debris, initiated the overload events in the compressor turbine section. Therefore, the initial blade separation originated within the compressor turbine section. Engine Failure procedure: I don't have much time in an Otter but the basic procedure assuming you are going to continue flying and not land immediately is to maintain minimum controllable single engine airspeed (This is paramount above all), maintain heading by using rudder and banking into the live engine, advancing power levers, power lever of dead engine to idle and then feathering the prop of the dead engine. Flaps can be retracted incrementally based on speed and obstacles. In this case the pilot didn't maintain airspeed. That is what lead to the type of impact the killed. The pilot had to have banked into the dead engine as well since the crash occurred right of runway centerline. I appears he did feather the dead engine. If you are a pilot and are down to one engine, you maintain airspeed at all costs even if you have to make a controlled crash landing. Of course we can pick this all apart and never know what was really going on in the cockpit. The NTSB stated that less injury or deaths would have been likely for those who would have tightened their seat belts (for those who were wearing one).

Here are some details. Conclusions Findings 1. Although damage to the accident airplane’s right engine precluded determination of the initial event that precipitated the overload fracturing of the compressor turbine blades, and although the operator was not required to comply with the engine manufacturer’s service bulletins, it is possible that the initiating fracture event within the engine resulted from a condition that could have been detected and corrected during an engine overhaul performed within the manufacturer’s recommended time between overhauls. 2. Although engine wear would have likely prevented the accident airplane from obtaining its maximum published single engine climb performance, the pilot’s failure to maintain airspeed, according to the technique specified in the published emergency procedures following the loss of power in one engine, negated any possibility of continued, controlled flight that could have allowed for a return to the airport or other suitable landing area. 3. Although the airplane’s autofeather system, had it been operative, would have helped the pilot promptly feather the propeller of the inoperative engine, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the inoperative autofeather system was a factor in the accident. 4. The pilot’s decision to use only 1,700 feet of the available runway diminished the margin of safety during takeoff and hindered his ability to safely respond to the airplane’s loss of engine power because it placed the airplane in closer lateral proximity to trees; this reduced the time available to the pilot to properly configure and effectively accelerate the airplane to achieve and maintain sufficient flying airspeed for takeoff, and it also eliminated the option of discontinuing the takeoff and performing a straight ahead, emergency landing on the runway. 5. Based on the results of the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute’s past testing and the serious and fatal injuries sustained by some of the restrained parachutists in this crash, a single point restraint system is not sufficient to provide adequate restraint for parachutists. 6. More parachutists may have survived, and injuries may have been reduced, if more effective restraints had been used. 7. Testing could identify the best method for dual point restraint for the accident airplane’s configuration and for the configurations of other airplanes commonly used in parachute operations. Probable Cause The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot’s failure to maintain airspeed following a loss of power in the right engine due to the fracturing of compressor turbine blades for undetermined reasons. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s decision to use only part of the available runway for the takeoff. Contributing to some parachutists’ injuries was the lack of a more effective restraint system on the airplane. Recommendations The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration: Conduct research, in conjunction with the United States Parachute Association, to determine the most effective dual point restraint systems for parachutists that reflects the various aircraft and seating configurations used in parachute operations. Once the most effective dual point restraint systems for parachutists are determined, as requested in Safety Recommendation , revise Advisory Circular 105 2C, Sport Parachute Jumping, to include guidance information about these systems. The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the United States Parachute Association Work with the Federal Aviation Administration to conduct research to determine the most effective dual point restraint systems for parachutists that reflects the various aircraft and seating configurations used in parachute operations. Once the most effective dual point restraint systems for parachutists are determined, as requested in Safety Recommendation, educate your members on the findings and encourage them to use the most effective dual point restraint systems.

About TBO. The NTSB report only cited one accident of the 32 investigated where TBO was part of the cause yet they want to make everyone rebuild engines at a specified number of hours. This would be the greatest financial impact of all the recommendations they made. The fact is that engines can last much longer...or shorter. Putting a number down for TBO is like saying pilots are unsafe at a certain age. Not all pilots are equal...just like engines. I know what will happen if the FAA adopts the TBO rule. The airplane logs will not reflect the actual hours flown. The law is already in place for engines to get rebuilt/replaced/fixed when they need it. Some operators just choose to ignore the facts or fail to have the engines checked as directed. This is true in many other commercial operations as well. So, even though engine TBO is only a very small factor in parachute operation deaths, how can we make it better? Accountability for maintenance neglect. I have no idea of how to go about that but using the TBO number isn't the best answer IMHO. The NTSB shouldn't be concerned with cost so much in making a recommendation but they should have good data for recommending such a change.

My opinion: Having additional initial and recurrent pilot training will be helpful and have a cost, but not prohibitive. Making operators overhaul engines at TBO (recommended overhaul by the manufacture) will costs a ton. The NTSB made a statement that jump operations limit the life of engines more so than in other operations. They have no evidence at all of this. In fact, they state in some accidents that the engines had nearly double the time of TBO. That amounts to thousands of jumps and years of operations. It seems they are in fact lasting much longer than the manufacture recommends overhaul. We don't want to run engines till they just quit. They should be allowed to go beyond TBO as long as inspections are made that reasonably insure the good health of the engine to continue. I'm not sure but guess an overhauled turbine for a King Air, Caravan or Otter is more than 100k. Being required to change an engine at TBO can nearly double the cost of operating a turbine aircraft for jump operations. How the manufacture comes up with TBO times may be a point of interest.

Here is what they recommended. To the Federal Aviation Administration: 1. Require parachute jump operators to develop and implement Federal Aviation Administration approved aircraft maintenance and inspection programs that include, at a minimum, requirements for compliance with engine manufacturers’ recommended maintenance instructions, such as service bulletins and service information letters for time between overhauls and component life limits. (A 08 XX) 2. Develop and distribute guidance materials, in conjunction with the United States Parachute Association, for parachute jump operators to assist operators in implementing effective aircraft inspection and maintenance quality assurance programs. (A 08 XX) 3. Require parachute jump operators to develop initial and recurrent pilot training programs that address, at a minimum, operation and aircraft specific weight and balance calculations, preflight inspections, emergency and recovery procedures, and parachutist egress procedures for each type of aircraft flown. (A 08 XX) 4. Require initial and recurrent pilot testing programs for parachute jump operations pilots that address, at a minimum, operation and aircraft specific weight and balance calculations, preflight inspections, emergency and recovery procedures, and parachutist egress procedures for each type of aircraft flown, as well as competency flight checks to determine pilot competence in practical skills and techniques in each type of aircraft. (A 08 XX) 5. Revise the guidance materials contained in Advisory Circular 105 2C, “Sport Parachute Jumping,” to include guidance for parachute jump operators in implementing effective initial and recurrent pilot training and examination programs that address, at a minimum, operation and aircraft specific weight and balance calculations, preflight inspections, emergency procedures, and parachutist egress procedures. 6. Require direct surveillance of parachute jump operators to include, at a minimum, maintenance and operations inspections. (A 08 XX) To the United States Parachute Association: 7. Work with the Federal Aviation Administration to develop and distribute guidance materials for parachute jump operators to assist operators in implementing effective aircraft inspection and maintenance quality assurance programs. (A 08 XX) 8. Once Advisory Circular (AC) 105 2C, “Sport Parachute Jumping,” has been revised to include guidance for parachute jump operators in implementing effective initial and recurrent pilot training and examination programs that address, at a minimum, operation and aircraft specific weight and balance calculations, preflight inspections, emergency procedures, and parachutist egress procedures, distribute this revised AC to your members and encourage adherence to its guidance.