DB Cooper

[Chaucer 103]

My Discussions With A Senior Director At NORAD Regarding The NORJACK Case

I had the extraordinary opportunity to speak to a gentleman with unique insights into the SAGE radar system. His name is Len Camp. He was a lieutenant in the Canadian Forces, assigned to SAGE in Syracuse, NY as a flight controller in 1973. Two years later, he was promoted to the rank of Captain and was rated as a NORAD expert controller. He served with NORAD for 28 years and ended his career as a senior director for NORAD with a rank of Lt. Col.. He graduated from Syracuse with a degree in mathematical physics. He then graduated from the University of North Dakota with a degree in Space-based Radar and Small Satellites.  He was trained in Aerospace Project Management with the Canadian Forces. He is currently the founder, CEO, and owner of HyperAero Consulting which consults the government and private companies on hypersonic aircraft. 

NORAD was a joint US-Canada military organization intended to provide early warning in the event of a Soviet attack on the North American continent. There were a few dozen Canadians and Americans “co-manning” at each other’s control centers and headquarters. This ensured that bi-national cooperation was a critical part of the mission. 

Lt. Col. Camp's expertise was in fighter control, so he had a ton of insight into how SAGE worked with interceptor jets. He said that there is a great deal of verbal communication between military and civilian air traffic control. When asked about Ammerman “taking over” the F-106s, Mr. Camp said that while it is feasible that one or both of the F-106 pilots was monitoring FAA frequencies and perhaps passing on first-hand information to Ammerman, the military would have absolutely retained control of the fighters during the intercept in accordance with FAA regulations (Order JO 7610.4W Special Operations).

When asked about the retention of the SAGE radar data, Mr. Camp was emphatic that the data would have been saved. His words were “absolutely and undoubtedly” all of the relevant data from the NORJACK hijacking would have been recorded and saved. In the event of an unusual incident, the weapons team, control center supervisor, or senior director could order the computer room to initiate a record for later analysis and/or evidence. For an event such as a commercial hijacking, the SAGE control center supervisor would likely  have requested the computer personnel to put the data of the event “on record”. Recording SAGE radar data was a common occurrence and something the techs would have been extremely familiar with. In fact, he said that any aircraft - civilian or military squawking an emergency IFF (Identity Friend Or Foe). Mode 3 :hijack”, “lost comms”, or “emergency” would have automatically been recorded. The computer could then print this data out on computer card decks  or long-form paper. This data would have been preserved as a stack of IBM cards for an indefinite period of time. 

Further, a “data reduction” could be done to eliminate extraneous data in the airspace to only focus on the relevant aircraft. This would provide a summary of the recorded radar data and IFF tracks. 

When asked about the possible construction of the yellow flight path map, Camp said that SAGE did not have the ability to print out a map. However, SAGE would print out the data, and it would then be translated by hand into GEOREF or the World Geographic Reference System. That could then be translated by hand into latitude and longitude. SAGE also had a special team of people who would do this in real time. There was a large glass display where data could be inputted using manual inputs: setting up special control zones, inputting flight plans, airbase weapons status, weather reports, etc.

So, they might receive a verbal report like: “from the Hawkeye beacon, 255 at 27,000” and could then manually plot that on the glass display. It would then be input into the AN/FSQ-7 Combat Direction Central or simply Q-7 which was the overall command and control system used by NORAD as a whole. 

Each SAGE blockhouse kept a qualified air crew on staff to provide expertise in any aviation matters that the radar techs and computer personnel might not be familiar with. It’s possible that this was Capt. Spangler’s duty on the night of the hijacking. Capt. Spangler was a C-141 pilot attached to the 62nd Airlift Wing.

Mr. Camp suspects that Capt. Spangler received the printouts of the IFF codes and the corresponding SAGE radar symbology. This symbology would have then been translated into GEOREF and then into longitude and latitude along with the corresponding timestamps. .These timestamps would be down to the tenth of a second.  The time frame of the computer is roughly 15 seconds with three sub-frames of about 5 seconds each. He considers it very likely Spangler chose the exact times  spaced about a  minute or apart to keep the clutter down on the map. Thus, it is highly likely that the radar plot points expressed in red Xs are exact down to within plus/minus 5 seconds. This means that if between 8:00:05 and 7:59:57, Spanger would have chosen 7:59:57 because it is closest to the round 8:00. This is significant regarding the timing of the map plot points.

Mr. Camp then believes that Capt. Spangler would have sat down at a drafting table and manually translated the GEOREF data into standard longitude and latitude onto the yellow sectional map.Later, an FBI agent would have added the blue ink “connect-the-dots and times. Camp considers it likely that the FBI would only have received the first plot of 7:54 and then been allowed to transfigure the rest of the information on its own. 

When asked about any confusion in the aircraft with the data, Mr. Camp said there was  absolutely no chance that SAGE would not be able to differentiate between the hijacked airliner, the Delta Darts or the T-33. The computer places track symbology on the fighter's data based on its call sign (ex. MP06) and a unique MODE 2 IFF assigned to each airframe as primary. The chase aircraft would be given a generic track number, usually UP21, but could also have a unique mode 2 code to help with track. Again, redundancy. It was literally used to “separate radar traffic” 

Mode 2 was military only. It provides a 4-digit octal (12 bit) unit code or tail number. Mode 3 micivilian and provides a 4-digit octal (12 bit) identification code for the aircraft, assigned by the air traffic controller. Commonly referred to as a squawk code. Thus, the IFF codes for the chase planes and the hijacked plane would have been completely different and recognizable both to the radar operator to on the printed radar data provided to Capt. Spangler.\

Meanwhile, the airliner with a Mode 3 “hijack” gives the computer  enhanced IFF to use in tracking logic. In other words, the hijacked airliner would have been the “star of the show” and would definitely be identifiable relative to the other aircraft. 

When asked about SAGE “losing an aircraft”, Mr. Camp said the only way SAGE could “lose” an aircraft is if the aircraft fell below 10,000 feet. Gaps in coverage might occur due to terrain masking. Typically, TRACON  or low altitude “gap filler” radar could provide that lost coverage if needed. Moreover, when asked about radar coverage, up to 20 radars could be tied to a single SAGE control center. He believes McChord had a dozen in 1971, perhaps more. Interesting, the first plot on the USAF map is 7:54 which corresponds to when Flight 305 reached an altitude of 10,000 feet AMSL. 

Importantly, there were military radars all over the country, not just along the coasts and borders. The entire 360 degree sweep of the airspace would be fed to SAGE. Thus, SAGE was not just outward looking but its radar provided coverage to the entire North American continent. 

Regarding the reliability of the SAGE system, by the 1970s, SAGE had a 99.5% reliability rate, according to Lt. Col. Camp. It also had BUIC or Back Up Interceptor Control sites that would act as redundancy should SAGE ever be knocked out by an attack. This is part of the military’s active redundancy concept. There was always a back-up to a back-up to a back-up.

Interestingly, Len put me in contact with the gentleman who was working the T-33’s training mission that night. We’ll call him John because he doesn’t want to be talked about publicly.  It was a 3 on 1 mission with the Air National Guard. John handed off the T-33 to another operator who was working the F-106 chase planes.. He said that the 3 F-101 pilots were shocked that their target was diverted to a higher priority mission. This man was sitting next to the gentleman who was working the F-106 chase jets, but doesn’t remember much else because he was focused on his F-101s who no longer had a target. 

So, what are the implications of Mr. Camp’s information?

First, we know what data was provided from SAGE. Second, we know how that data was used to create the flight path map. 

We also know the margin of error of the map - one nautical miles north-east-west-south and 5 seconds one way or the other. This means the yellow USAF map is far more precise than previously believed. It gives a tighter north-south error than we have suspected. 

We know that it eliminates any possibility that the map was constructed using faulty data.

We know that it eliminates the possibility that the chase jets were confused with 305. The SAGE radar data would have provided the Mode 2 and Mode 3 IFF codes that would have allowed Capt. Spanger to quickly identify which was the jetliner and which were the trailing aircraft.

We know it eliminates any possibility that SAGE would have “lost” Flight 305. Even if the radar operator was incompetent, the system still would have recorded the data. Also, SAGE recorded everything within a 360 circle of its airspace. 

We know  it eliminates any possibility that SAGE was “down” that night. It had a 99.5% reliability rate, and had multiple redundant systems in the event of a catastrophic failure. 

Clearly, Mr. Camp’s testimony puts to rest any notion of a “westerly flight path”. The radar data is sound. The construction of the flight path map would have been based on sound and unimpeachable data. 

If any question of a flight path outside the confines of Victor 23 ever existed, they should be squashed now. A flight path outside of Victor 23 was always fanciful and existed outside the boundaries of actual evidence. Mr. Camp’s testimony only underscores that. Moreover, Mr. Camp’s testimony is completely congruent with the FBI files we have seen. 

There are two anchor points in this case. The first one is the flight path. The second is the money find at Tena Bar. There are two mysteries in this case. The first one is the identity of DB Cooper. The second is how did the money arrive at Tena Bar. The answer to both of those is unknown, but we can be as certain as possible that moving the flight path to account for the money find is untenable and not in accordance with any factual evidence. 

The only question we should be asking ourselves - outside of the the identity of DB Cooper - is how did the money arrive here of the plane was over here.

 

[georger 197]

1 hour ago, Chaucer said:

My Discussions With A Senior Director At NORAD Regarding The NORJACK Case

I had the extraordinary opportunity to speak to a gentleman with unique insights into the SAGE radar system. His name is Len Camp. He was a lieutenant in the Canadian Forces, assigned to SAGE in Syracuse, NY as a flight controller in 1973. Two years later, he was promoted to the rank of Captain and was rated as a NORAD expert controller. He served with NORAD for 28 years and ended his career as a senior director for NORAD with a rank of Lt. Col.. He graduated from Syracuse with a degree in mathematical physics. He then graduated from the University of North Dakota with a degree in Space-based Radar and Small Satellites.  He was trained in Aerospace Project Management with the Canadian Forces. He is currently the founder, CEO, and owner of HyperAero Consulting which consults the government and private companies on hypersonic aircraft. 

NORAD was a joint US-Canada military organization intended to provide early warning in the event of a Soviet attack on the North American continent. There were a few dozen Canadians and Americans “co-manning” at each other’s control centers and headquarters. This ensured that bi-national cooperation was a critical part of the mission. 

Lt. Col. Camp's expertise was in fighter control, so he had a ton of insight into how SAGE worked with interceptor jets. He said that there is a great deal of verbal communication between military and civilian air traffic control. When asked about Ammerman “taking over” the F-106s, Mr. Camp said that while it is feasible that one or both of the F-106 pilots was monitoring FAA frequencies and perhaps passing on first-hand information to Ammerman, the military would have absolutely retained control of the fighters during the intercept in accordance with FAA regulations (Order JO 7610.4W Special Operations).

When asked about the retention of the SAGE radar data, Mr. Camp was emphatic that the data would have been saved. His words were “absolutely and undoubtedly” all of the relevant data from the NORJACK hijacking would have been recorded and saved. In the event of an unusual incident, the weapons team, control center supervisor, or senior director could order the computer room to initiate a record for later analysis and/or evidence. For an event such as a commercial hijacking, the SAGE control center supervisor would likely  have requested the computer personnel to put the data of the event “on record”. Recording SAGE radar data was a common occurrence and something the techs would have been extremely familiar with. In fact, he said that any aircraft - civilian or military squawking an emergency IFF (Identity Friend Or Foe). Mode 3 :hijack”, “lost comms”, or “emergency” would have automatically been recorded. The computer could then print this data out on computer card decks  or long-form paper. This data would have been preserved as a stack of IBM cards for an indefinite period of time. 

Further, a “data reduction” could be done to eliminate extraneous data in the airspace to only focus on the relevant aircraft. This would provide a summary of the recorded radar data and IFF tracks. 

When asked about the possible construction of the yellow flight path map, Camp said that SAGE did not have the ability to print out a map. However, SAGE would print out the data, and it would then be translated by hand into GEOREF or the World Geographic Reference System. That could then be translated by hand into latitude and longitude. SAGE also had a special team of people who would do this in real time. There was a large glass display where data could be inputted using manual inputs: setting up special control zones, inputting flight plans, airbase weapons status, weather reports, etc.

So, they might receive a verbal report like: “from the Hawkeye beacon, 255 at 27,000” and could then manually plot that on the glass display. It would then be input into the AN/FSQ-7 Combat Direction Central or simply Q-7 which was the overall command and control system used by NORAD as a whole. 

Each SAGE blockhouse kept a qualified air crew on staff to provide expertise in any aviation matters that the radar techs and computer personnel might not be familiar with. It’s possible that this was Capt. Spangler’s duty on the night of the hijacking. Capt. Spangler was a C-141 pilot attached to the 62nd Airlift Wing.

Mr. Camp suspects that Capt. Spangler received the printouts of the IFF codes and the corresponding SAGE radar symbology. This symbology would have then been translated into GEOREF and then into longitude and latitude along with the corresponding timestamps. .These timestamps would be down to the tenth of a second.  The time frame of the computer is roughly 15 seconds with three sub-frames of about 5 seconds each. He considers it very likely Spangler chose the exact times  spaced about a  minute or apart to keep the clutter down on the map. Thus, it is highly likely that the radar plot points expressed in red Xs are exact down to within plus/minus 5 seconds. This means that if between 8:00:05 and 7:59:57, Spanger would have chosen 7:59:57 because it is closest to the round 8:00. This is significant regarding the timing of the map plot points.

Mr. Camp then believes that Capt. Spangler would have sat down at a drafting table and manually translated the GEOREF data into standard longitude and latitude onto the yellow sectional map.Later, an FBI agent would have added the blue ink “connect-the-dots and times. Camp considers it likely that the FBI would only have received the first plot of 7:54 and then been allowed to transfigure the rest of the information on its own. 

When asked about any confusion in the aircraft with the data, Mr. Camp said there was  absolutely no chance that SAGE would not be able to differentiate between the hijacked airliner, the Delta Darts or the T-33. The computer places track symbology on the fighter's data based on its call sign (ex. MP06) and a unique MODE 2 IFF assigned to each airframe as primary. The chase aircraft would be given a generic track number, usually UP21, but could also have a unique mode 2 code to help with track. Again, redundancy. It was literally used to “separate radar traffic” 

Mode 2 was military only. It provides a 4-digit octal (12 bit) unit code or tail number. Mode 3 micivilian and provides a 4-digit octal (12 bit) identification code for the aircraft, assigned by the air traffic controller. Commonly referred to as a squawk code. Thus, the IFF codes for the chase planes and the hijacked plane would have been completely different and recognizable both to the radar operator to on the printed radar data provided to Capt. Spangler.\

Meanwhile, the airliner with a Mode 3 “hijack” gives the computer  enhanced IFF to use in tracking logic. In other words, the hijacked airliner would have been the “star of the show” and would definitely be identifiable relative to the other aircraft. 

When asked about SAGE “losing an aircraft”, Mr. Camp said the only way SAGE could “lose” an aircraft is if the aircraft fell below 10,000 feet. Gaps in coverage might occur due to terrain masking. Typically, TRACON  or low altitude “gap filler” radar could provide that lost coverage if needed. Moreover, when asked about radar coverage, up to 20 radars could be tied to a single SAGE control center. He believes McChord had a dozen in 1971, perhaps more. Interesting, the first plot on the USAF map is 7:54 which corresponds to when Flight 305 reached an altitude of 10,000 feet AMSL. 

Importantly, there were military radars all over the country, not just along the coasts and borders. The entire 360 degree sweep of the airspace would be fed to SAGE. Thus, SAGE was not just outward looking but its radar provided coverage to the entire North American continent. 

Regarding the reliability of the SAGE system, by the 1970s, SAGE had a 99.5% reliability rate, according to Lt. Col. Camp. It also had BUIC or Back Up Interceptor Control sites that would act as redundancy should SAGE ever be knocked out by an attack. This is part of the military’s active redundancy concept. There was always a back-up to a back-up to a back-up.

Interestingly, Len put me in contact with the gentleman who was working the T-33’s training mission that night. We’ll call him John because he doesn’t want to be talked about publicly.  It was a 3 on 1 mission with the Air National Guard. John handed off the T-33 to another operator who was working the F-106 chase planes.. He said that the 3 F-101 pilots were shocked that their target was diverted to a higher priority mission. This man was sitting next to the gentleman who was working the F-106 chase jets, but doesn’t remember much else because he was focused on his F-101s who no longer had a target. 

So, what are the implications of Mr. Camp’s information?

First, we know what data was provided from SAGE. Second, we know how that data was used to create the flight path map. 

We also know the margin of error of the map - one nautical miles north-east-west-south and 5 seconds one way or the other. This means the yellow USAF map is far more precise than previously believed. It gives a tighter north-south error than we have suspected. 

We know that it eliminates any possibility that the map was constructed using faulty data.

We know that it eliminates the possibility that the chase jets were confused with 305. The SAGE radar data would have provided the Mode 2 and Mode 3 IFF codes that would have allowed Capt. Spanger to quickly identify which was the jetliner and which were the trailing aircraft.

We know it eliminates any possibility that SAGE would have “lost” Flight 305. Even if the radar operator was incompetent, the system still would have recorded the data. Also, SAGE recorded everything within a 360 circle of its airspace. 

We know  it eliminates any possibility that SAGE was “down” that night. It had a 99.5% reliability rate, and had multiple redundant systems in the event of a catastrophic failure. 

Clearly, Mr. Camp’s testimony puts to rest any notion of a “westerly flight path”. The radar data is sound. The construction of the flight path map would have been based on sound and unimpeachable data. 

If any question of a flight path outside the confines of Victor 23 ever existed, they should be squashed now. A flight path outside of Victor 23 was always fanciful and existed outside the boundaries of actual evidence. Mr. Camp’s testimony only underscores that. Moreover, Mr. Camp’s testimony is completely congruent with the FBI files we have seen. 

There are two anchor points in this case. The first one is the flight path. The second is the money find at Tena Bar. There are two mysteries in this case. The first one is the identity of DB Cooper. The second is how did the money arrive at Tena Bar. The answer to both of those is unknown, but we can be as certain as possible that moving the flight path to account for the money find is untenable and not in accordance with any factual evidence. 

The only question we should be asking ourselves - outside of the the identity of DB Cooper - is how did the money arrive here of the plane was over here.

 

typo last paragraph ?

[JAGdb 71]

5 hours ago, Chaucer said:

"Three agents swear that when A2 and A3 were digging a trench about 2o yards south of the Ingram find, intending to go to a 3-4 foot depth, they had no more than brought the first shovel of material up and dumped it, than they saw a 'fist-sized clump of what looked like wadded up decomposed money, a ball of rotted bills', which they called everyone's attention to, and it was bagged to be sent off for analysis. (This is before Palmer had arrived). This suggests that perhaps some of the money which was at Tina Bar had fully decomposed, in contrast to the Ingram bills found higher up in elevation and in the upper active sand layers vs. other money which was perhaps at a lower depth and closer to the water line?"

 

If the above account is true about the fist sized clump of money, why wouldn't it be part of the official FBI story or documented evidence regarding the Tena Bar money find? 

[olemisscub 466]

3 hours ago, JAGdb said:

If the above account is true about the fist sized clump of money, why wouldn't it be part of the official FBI story or documented evidence regarding the Tena Bar money find? 

The Tena Bar 302's are virtually unusable they are so redacted. Here are all the ones I've been able to collect in the Vault. Might be missing one or two. 

TenaBar302s.pdf

[olemisscub 466]

3 hours ago, JAGdb said:

If the above account is true about the fist sized clump of money, why wouldn't it be part of the official FBI story or documented evidence regarding the Tena Bar money find? 

Couple of articles mention finding additional fragments/money

[JAGdb 71]

11 minutes ago, olemisscub said:

Couple of articles mention finding additional fragments/money

I hear you on the reports of fragments and clumps etc...but it all seems to be unofficial.  If they indeed found the fragments and possibly clumps, I would think that it would be part of the official summary regarding the Tena Bar money find.  There's no reason I could think of the FBI wanting to keep that quiet or under wraps.  

In the reference that Chaucer sited, it indicates that the clump was sent for analysis....well, where is the report of that analysis ?  Has Larry Carr ever commented on this ?

[olemisscub 466]

26 minutes ago, JAGdb said:

I hear you on the reports of fragments and clumps etc...but it all seems to be unofficial.  If they indeed found the fragments and possibly clumps, I would think that it would be part of the official summary regarding the Tena Bar money find.  There's no reason I could think of the FBI wanting to keep that quiet or under wraps.  

In the reference that Chaucer sited, it indicates that the clump was sent for analysis....well, where is the report of that analysis ?  Has Larry Carr ever commented on this ?

I'm with you. Concrete evidence that there was more than $5800 found would be pretty damn important. 

[Robert99 37]

27 minutes ago, olemisscub said:

I'm with you. Concrete evidence that there was more than $5800 found would be pretty damn important. 

This discussion suggests that the entire money bag arrived at Tena Bar relatively intact.

[FLYJACK 654]

11 hours ago, Chaucer said:

The "Eagle Line" was frequency 131.9 mHz that was used to connect jetliners with the NWA Flight Ops in Minneapolis. This is not in dispute. As I have stated, I have spoken with NWA radio operators, including the one above, to confirm this. NWA may have leased frequencies and equipment from ARINC but their radio network was independent. Clearly, in an emergency situation like NORJACK, common sense and decency held sway over corporate and proprietary matters. 

 

 

Since ARINC was a just a data protocol..  frequencies were assigned to different entities and clearly in December 1970 frequency 131.9 and 131.8 were ARINC assigned to "Air Carrier"...

I don't see why NWA frequency 131.9 can't also use the ARINC protocol.

[olemisscub 466]

30 minutes ago, Robert99 said:

This discussion suggests that the entire money bag arrived at Tena Bar relatively intact.

Possibly, but I think it still fits within the parameter of a single bundle being there, especially as they were described by Grinnell: 5 packet bundles. Ingram's found 3 packets. It's possible that these fragments and clumps were from the other two packets with that bundle. 

[FLYJACK 654]

I have been saying this for years... only now is it reaching critical mass.

The money arrived as it was given to Cooper in the same order in one single rubber banded bundle of several packets.. as the rubber bands deteriorated the packets separated slightly.

There were no sides to the money, only the top and bottom of the bill packets. One packet was missing some bills.. Rubber bands could never have been "intact"... there were fragments stuck to the top or bottom bill.

The reports were that the bundles were randomized,,, not in the FBI docs but if so then it may have been only three packets.. this is most likely for rubber bands to be on two of the three packets. If it were five packets then two of the middle packets would have to disappear.

 

Conclusion, a rubber banded bundle of packets (likely 3) landed on TBAR in the order and packaging as it was given to Cooper....    it might have been in a container, might might have been with other bundles but it did not have to be placed or buried to have all three packets together.

A bundle of ransom money got separated from Cooper at some point.. 

 

 

Edited September 15, 2023 by FLYJACK

[georger 197]

5 hours ago, olemisscub said:

I'm with you. Concrete evidence that there was more than $5800 found would be pretty damn important. 

................ nice work!

Edited September 15, 2023 by georger

[Chaucer 103]

2 hours ago, olemisscub said:

I'm with you. Concrete evidence that there was more than $5800 found would be pretty damn important. 

This has been discussed before, but apparently more serial numbers were discovered by the company Ingram hired. 

https://www.pcgs.com/news/pcgs-currency-notifies-fbi-of-d-b-cooper-serial-numbers?fbclid=IwAR0WHUTrH_LSMGQzk_YXE8wIqsTdrzYq0aPY3hi4OGbUqO3XY92m8sAre5g_aem_AZNtLSCmJBgldGIigR5WcbHbmT_PMV1SfO3-bij0_HgoOc9GMMpREJZq0bxP3Cu4wQw&mibextid=Zxz2cZ

The process revealed 35 additional full serial numbers that are on the FBI's 1971 complete list of notes given as ransom, but apparently were not recorded when the notes discovered by Mr. Ingram in 1980 subsequently were inventoried by investigators."

By my math, 35 additional numbers totals $700. $700 plus $5800 equals $6500. That would mean that there were, at one point, more than 3 packets, correct?

[FLYJACK 654]

1 hour ago, Chaucer said:

This has been discussed before, but apparently more serial numbers were discovered by the company Ingram hired. 

https://www.pcgs.com/news/pcgs-currency-notifies-fbi-of-d-b-cooper-serial-numbers?fbclid=IwAR0WHUTrH_LSMGQzk_YXE8wIqsTdrzYq0aPY3hi4OGbUqO3XY92m8sAre5g_aem_AZNtLSCmJBgldGIigR5WcbHbmT_PMV1SfO3-bij0_HgoOc9GMMpREJZq0bxP3Cu4wQw&mibextid=Zxz2cZ

The process revealed 35 additional full serial numbers that are on the FBI's 1971 complete list of notes given as ransom, but apparently were not recorded when the notes discovered by Mr. Ingram in 1980 subsequently were inventoried by investigators."

By my math, 35 additional numbers totals $700. $700 plus $5800 equals $6500. That would mean that there were, at one point, more than 3 packets, correct?

This is false.. the FBI never identified all the serial numbers initially, they only estimated the bill total.

The new numbers identified from fragments were not new bills..  but just existing bills that were unidentified from partials.

The FBI had a list of the serial numbers in order as given to Cooper.

So, 3 packets of 100 bills..  If a single identified serial number or partial fell outside those parameters they would know. 

One bundle was missing about 10 bills,,, plus the deterioration of the found packets made up the fragments found... I remember one frag found by the FBI had a serial number..

Palmer said the frags found 3 ft deep were likely moved from the digging process..

If the bundle was 5 packets, how do you get rubber band frags attached to two bundles,,  the packets in the middle would have to have deteriorated or washed away..

It was most likely 3 packets in one rubber banded bundle. The question is.. were there more bundles?

Edited September 15, 2023 by FLYJACK

[georger 197]

2 hours ago, FLYJACK said:

This is false.. the FBI never identified all the serial numbers initially, they only estimated the bill total.

The new numbers identified from fragments were not new bills..  but just existing bills that were unidentified from partials.

The FBI had a list of the serial numbers in order as given to Cooper.

So, 3 packets of 100 bills..  If a single identified serial number or partial fell outside those parameters they would know. 

One bundle was missing about 10 bills,,, plus the deterioration of the found packets made up the fragments found... I remember one frag found by the FBI had a serial number..

Palmer said the frags found 3 ft deep were likely moved from the digging process..

If the bundle was 5 packets, how do you get rubber band frags attached to two bundles,,  the packets in the middle would have to have deteriorated or washed away..

It was most likely 3 packets in one rubber banded bundle. The question is.. were there more bundles?

............... nice work!

Edited September 15, 2023 by georger

[FLYJACK 654]

11 minutes ago, georger said:

Where does Palmer say this?   Palmer said the frags found 3 ft deep were likely moved from the digging process..

We have gone over this many times...

 

[georger 197]

56 minutes ago, FLYJACK said:

We have gone over this many times...

 

............. nice work.

Edited September 15, 2023 by georger

[georger 197]

14 hours ago, Chaucer said:

My Discussions With A Senior Director At NORAD Regarding The NORJACK Case

I had the extraordinary opportunity to speak to a gentleman with unique insights into the SAGE radar system. His name is Len Camp. He was a lieutenant in the Canadian Forces, assigned to SAGE in Syracuse, NY as a flight controller in 1973. Two years later, he was promoted to the rank of Captain and was rated as a NORAD expert controller. He served with NORAD for 28 years and ended his career as a senior director for NORAD with a rank of Lt. Col.. He graduated from Syracuse with a degree in mathematical physics. He then graduated from the University of North Dakota with a degree in Space-based Radar and Small Satellites.  He was trained in Aerospace Project Management with the Canadian Forces. He is currently the founder, CEO, and owner of HyperAero Consulting which consults the government and private companies on hypersonic aircraft. 

NORAD was a joint US-Canada military organization intended to provide early warning in the event of a Soviet attack on the North American continent. There were a few dozen Canadians and Americans “co-manning” at each other’s control centers and headquarters. This ensured that bi-national cooperation was a critical part of the mission. 

Lt. Col. Camp's expertise was in fighter control, so he had a ton of insight into how SAGE worked with interceptor jets. He said that there is a great deal of verbal communication between military and civilian air traffic control. When asked about Ammerman “taking over” the F-106s, Mr. Camp said that while it is feasible that one or both of the F-106 pilots was monitoring FAA frequencies and perhaps passing on first-hand information to Ammerman, the military would have absolutely retained control of the fighters during the intercept in accordance with FAA regulations (Order JO 7610.4W Special Operations).

When asked about the retention of the SAGE radar data, Mr. Camp was emphatic that the data would have been saved. His words were “absolutely and undoubtedly” all of the relevant data from the NORJACK hijacking would have been recorded and saved. In the event of an unusual incident, the weapons team, control center supervisor, or senior director could order the computer room to initiate a record for later analysis and/or evidence. For an event such as a commercial hijacking, the SAGE control center supervisor would likely  have requested the computer personnel to put the data of the event “on record”. Recording SAGE radar data was a common occurrence and something the techs would have been extremely familiar with. In fact, he said that any aircraft - civilian or military squawking an emergency IFF (Identity Friend Or Foe). Mode 3 :hijack”, “lost comms”, or “emergency” would have automatically been recorded. The computer could then print this data out on computer card decks  or long-form paper. This data would have been preserved as a stack of IBM cards for an indefinite period of time. 

Further, a “data reduction” could be done to eliminate extraneous data in the airspace to only focus on the relevant aircraft. This would provide a summary of the recorded radar data and IFF tracks. 

When asked about the possible construction of the yellow flight path map, Camp said that SAGE did not have the ability to print out a map. However, SAGE would print out the data, and it would then be translated by hand into GEOREF or the World Geographic Reference System. That could then be translated by hand into latitude and longitude. SAGE also had a special team of people who would do this in real time. There was a large glass display where data could be inputted using manual inputs: setting up special control zones, inputting flight plans, airbase weapons status, weather reports, etc.

So, they might receive a verbal report like: “from the Hawkeye beacon, 255 at 27,000” and could then manually plot that on the glass display. It would then be input into the AN/FSQ-7 Combat Direction Central or simply Q-7 which was the overall command and control system used by NORAD as a whole. 

Each SAGE blockhouse kept a qualified air crew on staff to provide expertise in any aviation matters that the radar techs and computer personnel might not be familiar with. It’s possible that this was Capt. Spangler’s duty on the night of the hijacking. Capt. Spangler was a C-141 pilot attached to the 62nd Airlift Wing.

Mr. Camp suspects that Capt. Spangler received the printouts of the IFF codes and the corresponding SAGE radar symbology. This symbology would have then been translated into GEOREF and then into longitude and latitude along with the corresponding timestamps. .These timestamps would be down to the tenth of a second.  The time frame of the computer is roughly 15 seconds with three sub-frames of about 5 seconds each. He considers it very likely Spangler chose the exact times  spaced about a  minute or apart to keep the clutter down on the map. Thus, it is highly likely that the radar plot points expressed in red Xs are exact down to within plus/minus 5 seconds. This means that if between 8:00:05 and 7:59:57, Spanger would have chosen 7:59:57 because it is closest to the round 8:00. This is significant regarding the timing of the map plot points.

Mr. Camp then believes that Capt. Spangler would have sat down at a drafting table and manually translated the GEOREF data into standard longitude and latitude onto the yellow sectional map.Later, an FBI agent would have added the blue ink “connect-the-dots and times. Camp considers it likely that the FBI would only have received the first plot of 7:54 and then been allowed to transfigure the rest of the information on its own. 

When asked about any confusion in the aircraft with the data, Mr. Camp said there was  absolutely no chance that SAGE would not be able to differentiate between the hijacked airliner, the Delta Darts or the T-33. The computer places track symbology on the fighter's data based on its call sign (ex. MP06) and a unique MODE 2 IFF assigned to each airframe as primary. The chase aircraft would be given a generic track number, usually UP21, but could also have a unique mode 2 code to help with track. Again, redundancy. It was literally used to “separate radar traffic” 

Mode 2 was military only. It provides a 4-digit octal (12 bit) unit code or tail number. Mode 3 micivilian and provides a 4-digit octal (12 bit) identification code for the aircraft, assigned by the air traffic controller. Commonly referred to as a squawk code. Thus, the IFF codes for the chase planes and the hijacked plane would have been completely different and recognizable both to the radar operator to on the printed radar data provided to Capt. Spangler.\

Meanwhile, the airliner with a Mode 3 “hijack” gives the computer  enhanced IFF to use in tracking logic. In other words, the hijacked airliner would have been the “star of the show” and would definitely be identifiable relative to the other aircraft. 

When asked about SAGE “losing an aircraft”, Mr. Camp said the only way SAGE could “lose” an aircraft is if the aircraft fell below 10,000 feet. Gaps in coverage might occur due to terrain masking. Typically, TRACON  or low altitude “gap filler” radar could provide that lost coverage if needed. Moreover, when asked about radar coverage, up to 20 radars could be tied to a single SAGE control center. He believes McChord had a dozen in 1971, perhaps more. Interesting, the first plot on the USAF map is 7:54 which corresponds to when Flight 305 reached an altitude of 10,000 feet AMSL. 

Importantly, there were military radars all over the country, not just along the coasts and borders. The entire 360 degree sweep of the airspace would be fed to SAGE. Thus, SAGE was not just outward looking but its radar provided coverage to the entire North American continent. 

Regarding the reliability of the SAGE system, by the 1970s, SAGE had a 99.5% reliability rate, according to Lt. Col. Camp. It also had BUIC or Back Up Interceptor Control sites that would act as redundancy should SAGE ever be knocked out by an attack. This is part of the military’s active redundancy concept. There was always a back-up to a back-up to a back-up.

Interestingly, Len put me in contact with the gentleman who was working the T-33’s training mission that night. We’ll call him John because he doesn’t want to be talked about publicly.  It was a 3 on 1 mission with the Air National Guard. John handed off the T-33 to another operator who was working the F-106 chase planes.. He said that the 3 F-101 pilots were shocked that their target was diverted to a higher priority mission. This man was sitting next to the gentleman who was working the F-106 chase jets, but doesn’t remember much else because he was focused on his F-101s who no longer had a target. 

So, what are the implications of Mr. Camp’s information?

First, we know what data was provided from SAGE. Second, we know how that data was used to create the flight path map. 

We also know the margin of error of the map - one nautical miles north-east-west-south and 5 seconds one way or the other. This means the yellow USAF map is far more precise than previously believed. It gives a tighter north-south error than we have suspected. 

We know that it eliminates any possibility that the map was constructed using faulty data.

We know that it eliminates the possibility that the chase jets were confused with 305. The SAGE radar data would have provided the Mode 2 and Mode 3 IFF codes that would have allowed Capt. Spanger to quickly identify which was the jetliner and which were the trailing aircraft.

We know it eliminates any possibility that SAGE would have “lost” Flight 305. Even if the radar operator was incompetent, the system still would have recorded the data. Also, SAGE recorded everything within a 360 circle of its airspace. 

We know  it eliminates any possibility that SAGE was “down” that night. It had a 99.5% reliability rate, and had multiple redundant systems in the event of a catastrophic failure. 

Clearly, Mr. Camp’s testimony puts to rest any notion of a “westerly flight path”. The radar data is sound. The construction of the flight path map would have been based on sound and unimpeachable data. 

If any question of a flight path outside the confines of Victor 23 ever existed, they should be squashed now. A flight path outside of Victor 23 was always fanciful and existed outside the boundaries of actual evidence. Mr. Camp’s testimony only underscores that. Moreover, Mr. Camp’s testimony is completely congruent with the FBI files we have seen. 

There are two anchor points in this case. The first one is the flight path. The second is the money find at Tena Bar. There are two mysteries in this case. The first one is the identity of DB Cooper. The second is how did the money arrive at Tena Bar. The answer to both of those is unknown, but we can be as certain as possible that moving the flight path to account for the money find is untenable and not in accordance with any factual evidence. 

The only question we should be asking ourselves - outside of the the identity of DB Cooper - is how did the money arrive here of the plane was over here.

 

.............  nice work

Edited September 15, 2023 by georger

[FLYJACK 654]

3 minutes ago, georger said:

Oh, the famous news paper article!   Did Palmer beat his dog too ?

Yes we have been over this before - I wonder why!  Its bullshit.

Right,, ever wonder why you have little credibility in this case..  you have earned it.

[georger 197]

51 minutes ago, FLYJACK said:

Right,, ever wonder why you have little credibility in this case..  you have earned it.

........................ nice work!

 

Edited September 15, 2023 by georger

[georger 197]

4 hours ago, Robert99 said:

This discussion suggests that the entire money bag arrived at Tena Bar relatively intact.

........................... nice work.

[Chaucer 103]

1 hour ago, FLYJACK said:

Right,, ever wonder why you have little credibility in this case..  you have earned it.

I'd suggest that when it comes to the money find, georger has the most credibility of any researcher in the Vortex. 

[olemisscub 466]

1 hour ago, Chaucer said:

I'd suggest that when it comes to the money find, georger has the most credibility of any researcher in the Vortex. 

…………nice work!

[FLYJACK 654]

3 hours ago, Chaucer said:

I'd suggest that when it comes to the money find, georger has the most credibility of any researcher in the Vortex. 

I'd suggest you haven't been paying attention.

How can anyone have credibility when they get everything wrong over the years.

He spent years denying the paper bands, even made up evidence claiming Tina was asked and meant rubber bands and he has spent years denying there was a difference between bundles and packets... 

He could never understand the difference... and what it meant to TBAR..

Credibility,,,,, the guy was lost. He probably still denies paper bands or packets.

Georger couldn't grasp the diatom evidence..  He attacked Tom Kaye, he attacked me for helping Tom.

Georger got very little right... he grabbed a narrative early and just denied and riduculed all evidence that contradicted it. That isn't a researcher.

He claims the quote from Palmer is BS, but Georger has no evidence or authority to make that claim. He just doesn't like that it doesn't fit his theory. 

Georger makes up stuff, he is not reliable..

 

I was the one who got the money find right over the years, Georger and most everyone else had it wrong..

Georger and R99 complained back then to Shutter, who told me to shut up about the TBAR money even though I was correct...  they were wrong and tried to get me kicked off the forum. Sure, that sounds like a credible researcher.

Georger has no credibility. I don't of anyone else in the Vortex who has just made up evidence and been so wrong.. it is though he is stuck in 2011.

Edited September 16, 2023 by FLYJACK

[FLYJACK 654]

Palmer report

Fragments and money in top six - eight inch layer...

If Palmer believed fragments were legitimately found over 3 feet deep, he would have said so.

 

 

Palmer believed the fragments found at 3 ft depth was caused by digging operations.