DHS Cancels Biowatch Gen-3 Program

[Rickendiver 6]

This one finally got me pissed enough to vent in the psycho forum
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-biowatch-20140426,0,4684978.story#axzz30H24awiV

I guess vulnerability to bio attack is no longer a concern for this administration
Why am I pissed? Because I have first hand knowledge that every reason given in this article is total BS

[quade 3]

Rickendiver

This one finally got me pissed enough to vent in the psycho forum
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-biowatch-20140426,0,4684978.story#axzz30H24awiV
I guess vulnerability to bio attack is no longer a concern for this administration

It doesn't look like that's what the article said at all.

It looks like the article says the current system in place works, but that the new system has been halted.

What you're saying is like saying the Administration doesn't care about air defense anymore because of cutbacks in the F-35 program. That would be a ridiculous statement to make on several levels.

So, tell us why this Gen 3 system is so critical? If possible, show us with links we can see and judge for ourselves.

quade -
The World's Most Boring Skydiver

[Rickendiver 6]

Thanks for your interest, Quade.
These links are a start. The second one was early in the development of the automated system:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32152.html
http://www.pathobiologics.org/btac/ref/APDS_Dzenitis92106.pdf

The system in place typically gives a response in about 2 days. the automated system gives an answer in 3 hours. Given that a bio strike would likely come at a transportation hub, 2 days is outside the timeline for effective intervention. The first link describes this.

I'm saying that the automated system was canceled for reasons other than what was stated in the article, or any of the previous ones leading up to it. I know this, because I'm a co-developer of Biowatch Gen 2 & 3. I was personally present in a technical capacity every day of performance testing.
Photos are of me working on Gen 2 systems in a well known east coast transportation hub. OK, one was having a beer afterwards.

[ryoder 1,381]

When the Department of Homeland Hysteria decides *not* to spend a billion dollars, I have a hard time being upset about it.

"There are only three things of value: younger women, faster airplanes, and bigger crocodiles" - Arthur Jones.

[kawisixer01 0]

DHS is too busy buying hollow point bullets to afford anything else.

[Arvoitus 1]

Rickendiver

... because I'm a co-developer of Biowatch Gen 2 & 3...

So basically you're upset because the government handouts have dried up?

Seriously, that whole thing sounds like something someone who has seen too many episodes of 24 and read too many Tom Clancy novels, would dream up.

Your rights end where my feelings begin.

[Rickendiver 6]

You're certainly entitled to your snarky opinion. No, I stopped working on this a few years ago, and don't depend on this for a living.
I've never watched "24", and never read a Clancy novel.

[GeorgiaDon 340]

So is it your argument that the false positive rate was not so high that the police demanded a unit be removed? Or that the unit requires less frequent field servicing than the CBO report suggests?

It's one thing to demonstrate sensitivity and specificity under controlled lab conditions, but the field can be very tough. Do you know for sure that your luminex bead assay doesn't cross-react with any environmental contaminants? Also the same for the TaqMan PCR? There are a lot of bacteria out there, do you know that your target sequence is not present in any other species? All you need for amplification is a close enough match for your primers to anneal (1 or 2 mismatches at the 3' end would probably be tolerated), close enough and in the right orientation for a product to be amplified. Unlikely, perhaps, but given the diversity of bacterial genomes available in the environment even unlikely events become probable. There is such a thing as being too sensitive, if it causes false positives and a major (and expensive) reaction each time.

All in all it's an impressive feat of technology for sure! However if it really costs 4X the present system to install and maintain it would have to offer some real advantages. A 3 hr response time vs 2 days would seem to be an advantage, but it seems to me a bioterrorism attack in a subway station, for example, would consist of a single release and probably of fairly short duration. People who passed through that site during the release (say, ~30 min) would be exposed and carry the agent on their clothing and such to other sites. How much difference would it make if the authorities could put out the alert 3 hrs down the road or 2 days? Either way the same number of people would have passed through the station at the time of the attack. Although it's true those people would have been able to interact with more people in 2 days than 3 hrs, how much increased transmission would result? If we're talking about an infectious agent (say, aerosolized plague) people would have to get infected and have the pathogen proliferate to the point where they become infectious, unlikely in just a couple of days. I suppose it might be different if we're talking about anthrax spores, though people would have to be pretty contaminated to continue to shed spores in infectious levels for days vs hours. Any monitoring system that is not "real time" would require everyone who was at the site around the time of the attack to self-report and voluntarily come in for treatment/quarantine. My point is, would the shorter timeline reduce the risk enough to justify an additional expenditure of 2-3 billion dollars/year, especially considering we're taking about a rare event? For less money, I'd think you could vaccinate a lot of people against anthrax, or ensure hospitals had enough drugs on hand to treat anyone who did get infected.

Don

_____________________________________
Tolerance is the cost we must pay for our adventure in liberty. (Dworkin, 1996)
“Education is not filling a bucket, but lighting a fire.” (Yeats)

[quade 3]

Rickendiver

I'm saying that the automated system was canceled for reasons other than what was stated in the article, or any of the previous ones leading up to it.

And what are those reasons and can you prove it with some sort of evidence we can see rather than simply take your word for?

quade -
The World's Most Boring Skydiver

[Rickendiver 6]

Yes! Highly intelligent questions. Yes, assay is bullet proof & EXTENSIVELY tested for cross reactivity and specificity on all signatures in the field, Los Alamos and with CDC. Also system controls & analysis algorithms eliminated any anomalies. This was a huge effort - Not at liberty to speak further on assay specifics.

There WERE NO false positives. The systems were not pulled from the field for that reason. This is over sever hundred thousand assay data points in the field over about 6 years. Also, to be specific- those were Gen 2 prototypes, and not Gen 3 production units.

Imagine a major transportation hub such as GCT in NYC getting dosed with Ba or Yp, etc. Hundreds of thousand of people each day who, in 2 days could literally be any where in the world without much hope of tracing the source. By the time symptoms present, how many doctors possess the information to even make a correct diagnosis? Autopsies would probably reveal the cause at that point. But I digress...The merits of whether or not to have this capability is another argument.

My reason for being cheesed off - If someone with more information than me made an intelligent decision to cancel this program, then fine they should say so. But I'm saying that their STATED reasons are not true. I'm saying that I was there, and that I know otherwise.
Anyways, done ranting. Like I said, I'm no longer involved with bio-instrumentation(or DHS).

The systems really are a marvelous integration of engineering, chemistry & biology. It's a shame that after all the cost and effort of R&D, they won't be deployed.

[Rickendiver 6]

Aye, there's the rub. No, I honestly can't think of how I can prove that I'm less full of shit than DHS is, because DHS owns the data.
I guess THEY could prove it by releasing that.

Gen 2 was pulled from NYC in 2009 for the government contract bid process to be implemented for Gen 3. Quite a convoluted deal, as I found out. I had to take a LOA and work as an independent contractor for a while, just to be within their rules.

All I can do is provide anecdotal proof that I was there, patents and relevant journal papers that I'm co-author on. (Google my name + APDS) There's also a few bartenders in East Village that might remember me

[CorvusCrypto 0]

So while the article SAYS that the program is halted my buddy's PI (Andrew) at SNL just got renewed funding from the DoD for their bio-sensing initiative... Although they are using the "canary" method of sensing with yeast (silica-coated), not pcr-based sensing.

but come on, you and I both know those gen-2 pcr systems had a bit of a hiccup with primer dimers now and again

either way I can tell you at least some biosensing research is being performed still

"I would rather be ashes than dust. I would rather be a majestic eagle riding a missile across the sky with sparklers than be an old couch potato." - Jack London (paraphrased)

[Rickendiver 6]

Good to know!

Time for me to quit worrying and jump some more

[jakee 1,254]

kawisixer01

DHS is too busy buying hollow point bullets to afford anything else.

Yuri: I also have some dim-dims. You use this word, dim-dims? The bullets that make the head explode?
Harry: Dum-dums. Yeah.
Yuri: Would you like some of these dim-dims?
Harry: I know I shouldn't... but I will. [takes whole case]

Do you want to have an ideagasm?