Cypres 2 incident from 2008 - WAS: Philosophy of banning the Argus

[rhys 0]

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No, they really should be. They don't work the way they are supposed to, and even though you feel the failures are acceptable, they are not. If something doesn't work right, you don't keep jumping it because you don't 'think' the failure will be a problem, you stop jumping it until the problem has been resolved.

By that rationale, all cypres 2 should be grounded, and vigils.

NONE of the AAD manufacturers have a squeaky clean record and when my friend was almost killed by a cypres 2, and they failed to give him any reason, apology or any contact at all, makes me wonder how often thtis has happened and gone unoticed before.

My firends' Cypres 2 fired at 1000 feet minutes after deployment, his reserve deployed and just before landing went into downplane at 20 feet, he hit hard and ripped a new asshole. If it had have happened at 100 feet and he died, what would have happened then...? What has changed in Cypres 2 units since that incident....,NOTHING!

I am not defending argus as i don;t know enough about them but knowing Airtec would rather sweep potential fatality under the carpet....

So an argus failed once or twice, do they fail always?

What is the difference between a cutter failing or a unit firing when it shouldn't?

NOTHING, they both could cause death or both could equate to nothing.

I would sure rather a cutter failing than one firing when I am trying to approach.

SHAME ON AIRTEC for ignoring Andre and his request for answers. A simple sorry would have sufficed.

"When the power of love overcomes the love of power, then the world will see peace." - 'Jimi' Hendrix

[davelepka 4]

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What is the difference between a cutter failing or a unit firing when it shouldn't?

If the cutter is mounted above the PC, and it fails tp cut the loop, it can also pin the remaining loop in the cutter. In that case, manually pulling the reserve ripcord would do nothing, as the reserve container would still be held shut by the cutter hanging on to the loop.

An AAD firing when it shouldn't is also a problem, but if it occurs after the main canopy deployment, it could just turn into a harmless two-out, or if it does downplane high enough, the main can be cutaway.

The primary difference is that in the case of a misfire, the mechanical apsect of the AAD works, but it's the software that isn't 'performing'. This could be due to bad software, or to other presure related anomolies. Let's face it, skydiving is a dynamic environment, and it's tough to plan for every eventuality. I'm not surprised that from time to time jumpers find a way to thread through the software, and set up conditions where an AAD will fire when it's not needed.

However, just because a jumper can find an odd circumstance where they can trick an AAD into firing does not preclude the unit from working properly when the firing conditions are met in an actual emergancy.

In the case of the Argus, the situation is the opposite. The software seems to work as-designed. All fo the cases where the cutter failed appeared to be either actual emergencies or low deployments, in either case, the AAD trigged the cutter as it should. The problem is in the mechanical functioning of the cutter, and the reason that's different than 'imperfect software' is that a bad cutter will never allow the unit to work properly. See?

Vigil or Cypres2, you may be able to trick the software into firing, but the unit will fire as-desgned when you do. It will also function properly if it encoutners the circumstances when it's supposed to fire. The Argus may know better when to (or not to) trigger the cutter, but the cutter itself is what fails. Even if the 'genius' software in the Argus knows your every move and holds back until you really do need it, the AAD will not function as-designed due to the faulty cutter. If the loop is not severed, the AAD fails 100%.

Beyond that, the Cypres2 and Vigil misfires were not random shots in the middle of a skydive, they were all down low where they were supposed to be (or close). A mis-fire is never good, but if they're always down low, at least they don't endanger anyone besides the user. If the mis-fires were higher, above break off altitudes, then it might be more of a concern due to the possibility of a freefall collision, and the fact that the unit would be operating way outside it's perameters. As it sits, the unit were in the right neighborhood, and it likely that the conditions were met, and they did their job. If you don't want that risk, don't jump an AAD.

[rhys 0]

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If the cutter is mounted above the PC, and it fails tp cut the loop, it can also pin the remaining loop in the cutter. In that case, manually pulling the reserve ripcord would do nothing, as the reserve container would still be held shut by the cutter hanging on to the loop.

So the cutter should be moved to the bottom of the tray.

Probem solved.

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However, just because a jumper can find an odd circumstance where they can trick an AAD into firing does not preclude the unit from working properly when the firing conditions are met in an actual emergancy.

This happened on a tandem at 1000 feet flying slowly around. the unit failed, it caused a 2 out at around 500 feet, the decision was made to land the 2 out as the risers of the main could interfere with the reserve.

The downplane began shortly before flare and resulted in a very hard impact.

This was on a beach with soft wet sand. if it was on asphelt the would have been very seriously injured.

AIRTEC failed to reply to his email(s) they just swept it under the carpet. the unit was sent back to them.. the resluts????

Nothing.

Will this happen again? we cannot be sure.

So in a nutshell, we are told that an AAD should not be expected to work, it is a back up device so if it fails to cut the loop and that results in a locked reserve container it is not only the aad manufacturers problem but the harness manufacturers problem.

If an AAD fires at 1000 feet, well after the main is depolyed then that can also kill someone. Don't try to pretend a 2 out is a simple problem that we should be all good with...


The fact of the matter is that Cypres failed, it could have killed 2 people, and nothing was done about it...

vigils would fire when a door was opened at 1000 feet, how many places do that? they could have killed a whole plane load....

ban all of them I say!

"When the power of love overcomes the love of power, then the world will see peace." - 'Jimi' Hendrix

[sundevil777 93]

I don't recall this incident.

The 'skydiving community' can apply a fair degree of peer pressure, even on a prominent company like Airtek, when it is warranted. This forum is the most prominent way of providing a vehicle for that pressure.

Please provide a link so we can see how this incident was discussed on this site.

People are sick and tired of being told that ordinary and decent people are fed up in this country with being sick and tired. I’m certainly not, and I’m sick and tired of being told that I am

[rhys 0]

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I don't recall this incident.

The 'skydiving community' can put a apply a fair degree of peer pressure, even on a prominent company like Airtek, when it is warranted. This forum is the most prominent way of providing a vehicle for that pressure.

Please provide a link so we can see how this incident was discussed on this site.

I remember contributing to that discussion so it is there somwhere, I have had a look but cannot seem to locate it, I will continue to look.

"When the power of love overcomes the love of power, then the world will see peace." - 'Jimi' Hendrix

[billvon 2,396]

>So the cutter should be moved to the bottom of the tray.

Then the AAD won't open the reserve when the packjob is very tight. That's a bad thing.

>Will this happen again? we cannot be sure.

You are exactly correct. You cannot be sure with any AAD. Any AAD can fire when it's not supposed to or not fire when it's supposed to. That's the risk you take when you use an AAD.

>ban all of them I say!

Feel free to do so at your DZ.

[pchapman 261]

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AIRTEC failed to reply to his email(s) they just swept it under the carpet. the unit was sent back to them.. the resluts????

Nothing.

This is a little side conversation about the incident Rhys brought up about a Cypres fire to a tandem under canopy. Clearly their response was poor.

Looking at their 2008 Cypres 2 recall due to faulty sensors, I see they mentioned two Australian activations that caused them to look into the issue. So I don't personally know if that included your case, but it sounds like it may have been.

So (IF true) at least they took decisive action overall, even if their communications with a particular customer was terribly unresponsive.

[mjosparky 3]

Argus has had 11 SB since they came on the market I believe early in 2006. Cypres has had 11 SB since they first came out I believe in 1991.

Argus web site is shut down for all practical purposes.

Sparky

http://www.argus-aad.com/

My idea of a fair fight is clubbing baby seals

[rhys 0]

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This is a little side conversation about the incident Rhys brought up about a Cypres fire to a tandem under canopy. Clearly their response was poor.

Looking at their 2008 Cypres 2 recall due to faulty sensors, I see they mentioned two Australian activations that caused them to look into the issue. So I don't personally know if that included your case, but it sounds like it may have been.

So (IF true) at least they took decisive action overall, even if their communications with a particular customer was terribly unresponsive.

My gripe is that I know the AAD manufacturers were informed by the company that produces the sensor that there was a batch of faulty sensors.

Now I cannot be 100% sure of these dates but I found out after andres incident, aviacom recalled their units immediatly and ceased production until new sensors were delivered, it seems airtec did not, airtec only recalled the units afer the incident.

The incident was discussed in deatil in the incident forum, here I have found what seems a very watered down version of the conversation. I remember contributing to that conversation but my comments many more are gone. Can any of you imagine such a short thread about a cypres 2 firing on a tandem for no known reason? maybe I missedanother threadbut i sure have looked for it.

...If airtec allowed units into the market that they knew were faulty...then thay should be held responsible. He was seriously injured, he lost thousands of dollars in lost income while he healed and the safety bulliten clearly stated that nobody was hurt....= LIES.

Now who is being misleading here?

If so, who watered down that thread and for what reason... commercial interests?

Safety my ass!

What we need is a date of the letter that was sent out by the company that manufactures the sensor, I know that it went out, so if we had that date we can clarify whether airtec ignored it an let fate take its toll on my buddy.

Someone mentioned argus has hadmore recalls than cypres, and gave a number, was there a recall for faulty sensors before march 2008?

I am sure the AAD manufacturers are reading this, so step up to the plate and clarify the situation. You know when you were informed by the sensor manufacturer about the faulty sensors, was that before or after the incident?

maybe this topic deserves its own thread?


Back to the topic of the thread; If test results are being witheld from Aviacom that are pertinent to resolving this issue...Why?

"When the power of love overcomes the love of power, then the world will see peace." - 'Jimi' Hendrix

[mjosparky 3]

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Someone mentioned argus has hadmore recalls than cypres, and gave a number, was there a recall for faulty sensors before march 2008?

The post just before yours gives the number of SB issued by both companies. If you are interested is one specific one look it up. Argus SB are really hard to find since they do not show them on the web site. Cypres does.

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My gripe is that I know the AAD manufacturers were informed by the company that produces the sensor that there was a batch of faulty sensors.

You say you know, what is your sourse? How come this in not gereral knowledge in the rigging community?

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If so, who watered down that thread and for what reason... commercial interests?

First Argus and now you claiming it is all a conspiracy to bring down Aviacom. You might find some information here.

http://www.conspiracyplanet.com/index.cfm

Aviacom is a company that does 3D graphics, makes card readers, blue tooth devices and perfume bottles. It seems that the manufacture of AAD’s is a side line.

http://www.aviacom.com/

Sparky

My idea of a fair fight is clubbing baby seals

[rhys 0]

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First Argus and now you claiming it is all a conspiracy to bring down Aviacom. You might find some information here.

Actually I couldn't give a shit about Aviacom, I don't have an AAD well actually I am part owner of 6 tandem cyress but in my Personal gear I dont have one.

I care about integrety.

My rant started with people bleating how great airtec is an how they are the be all and end all, and I know that they witheld information from my buddy that fell victim to one of thier units failing, he was injured, and thier report said he was not.

They lied simple.

Now the letter about the sensor recall; I have already stated that I talked to the owner of argus at the 2008 world meet about Andres incident, he informed me that his company was ridiculed for yet another recall (that was no fault of thier own) while airtec was praised for not having to do so.

If the sensors are common in all modern aad's then how is not recalling units better than reacalling them, and why wait for an incident.

If I am misinformed, like I have mentioned, the reps for vigil and cypres (or aviacom) will likely read this and they are more than welcome to put my mind at ease. but it appears as though airtec is the irresponsible one in the case of their misfire.

So not as squeaky clean as many would like to think.

Once agian I may be mis informed about the letter but there was no malice in the way he told me, he was more about the flack he got for having to reacall for something that was out of his controll. (so you can take at least one SB off the black list)

Airteck lied about andres injuries, they were not overly serious injuries but they were significant and he was in pain and the simply lied about it to make themselves look good.

He asked them for an answer and they simply ignored him.

Not good.

"When the power of love overcomes the love of power, then the world will see peace." - 'Jimi' Hendrix

[PhreeZone 15]

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If so, who watered down that thread and for what reason... commercial interests?

No one deleted or removed a single post from that thread that you just linked. I don't know why you think someone did but the post count on it clearly shows nothing has been removed or changed.

Yesterday is history
And tomorrow is a mystery

Parachutemanuals.com

[pchapman 261]

Hi Rhys & MJO,

That graphics & marketing company with the www.aviacom.com domain name seems to have nothing to do with the Aviacom SA that has the argus-aad.com page and makes the Argus. Unless there's something in the background I don't know about.

Yes, Rhys does tend to see conspiracies but there's lots of useful stuff in his posts too. It may be uncertain that Cypres related criticisms have ever disappeared from this site (as he alleged in the "Letter from Argus" thread). But still it is reasonable to be concerned about an incident he says Airtec glossed over, and the serious allegation about Airtec using faulty sensors -- an allegation that didn't originate with him. (More later in this post.)

Where did Argus (or Aviacom, whatever one wants to use) ever have 11 service bulletins? The Australian Parachuting Federation site shows only 5, and one relates to another companies' products -- bad Cypres disks. (Sure, a million other companies and countries have banned Argus' with bulletins at one time or other, but that's different.)

Three deal with their cutter woes (nothing for the Texas incident yet other than the letter that effectively shutts down their site), and one recalling 40 units of a batch in 2006 shortly after shipping, due to a software error. And on their site they used to have information about a fight they had with a Dutch rigger or rigging group, but it wasn't an SB.

So there's no paper trail for us about their deciding not to use the "bad" pressure sensors, because that would be a decision made before building units with them.

Cypres had their Cypres 2 bad sensor recall in 2008.

I don't recall Argus ever saying anything in public about bad sensors. (That was something you heard in conversation with someone at Argus, Rhys? Can you confirm whether it was Argus or Vigil? Sorry, I don't see that particular post at the moment.)

It was Vigil who claimed Cypres waited until there were problems in 2008 to recall the sensors, while Vigil immediately sent the bad sensors back in 2006. (This was in their "Open letter to our dealers and customers" during their 2008 fight with Mr. Fradet and the French Federation.)

Just trying to sort out what's really happening.

[ufk22 32]

So, based on what you were "told" by the owner of Argus, Cypres lied and didn't immediately deal with a problem, even though they did do a recall and you aren't sure exactly when they found out about the problem with the sensors.
"They are bad"
The rig manufacturers (and PIA and the rest of the industry) found out about a well documented (at least 3 times) problem with the Argus and acted (though some might complain about how slow they acted, after the 3rd known incident things seemed to happen) to deal with the problem while the AAD manufacturer sat on his hands.
"they are bad, and it's all politics"
Am I wrong in seeing a little inconsistency in your argument?
If your point is that no AAD is perfect, I fully accept that. I don't expect perfection. I do expect a manufacturer to deal with issues as they arise, and not to argue that a known problem is not a problem.
I bought an Argus 3 years ago on the advice of a rigger who is also a good friend and Kirk at Para-Concepts. They gave me their best advice at the time. Based on what we know now, I made the wrong decision. I've got a Cypres coming, I don't consider the Argus safe, but I don't blame the people who found the problem or the people who are dealing with it. I don't blame others who advised me to buy the Argus. I do, however, blame the manufacturer for stonewalling on this. I also don't see that this is similar to the situation you are discussing.
Facts vs hearsay

This is the paradox of skydiving. We do something very dangerous, expose ourselves to a totally unnecesary risk, and then spend our time trying to make it safer.

[MakeItHappen 15]

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I do, however, blame the manufacturer for stonewalling on this.

According to the argus web site and several others that have more direct knowledge of the TX incident, Argus has not been able to examine the aad in question. They will get to see it on Monday Mar 28.
If anyone has been stonewalling I suspect the owner or the rigger that last packed the rig.

.

.
Make It Happen
Parachute History
DiveMaker

[ufk22 32]

According to the argus web site and several others that have more direct knowledge of the TX incident, Argus has not been able to examine the aad in question. They will get to see it on Monday Mar 28.
If anyone has been stonewalling I suspect the owner or the rigger that last packed the rig.

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I'd agree if this were the 1st incident.
This is at least the 3rd, in addition to failed testing of the cutter by an outside rigger.
Would you consider taking down a product and support website and replacing it with a whiny letter to be "acting responsibly"?
People I've talked to in the industry have said that the lack of any real response from Argus is just as big a factor as the incidents in their decision to ban the Argus.

This is the paradox of skydiving. We do something very dangerous, expose ourselves to a totally unnecesary risk, and then spend our time trying to make it safer.

• Quote

[dpreguy 14]

Long long before any of this cutter failure "era", I just used common sense and combined it with the difficulty in cutting Cypres loop material (have to have a very good par of scissors to cut it) and wondered about the loop being trapped in the cutting piston after a fire. Seemed like a problem to me, simply because the loop material is so tough and tenacious.

OK, then came the wave of repositioning requirements from many-most of the rig mfgs. to put the cutter ABOVE the pilot chute. When this came about I still had the same nagging thoughts about the cutting piston not cutting the loop, but just jamming it in the mechanism and trapping it; and of course in that case, even if you pull the ripcord pin, nothing can ever get out! I jump a H/C with the cutter below everything. (Sunpath). In any trapping/uncut loop scenario, I reasoned I could at least I could manually pull the ripcord and it would deploy, without regard to what was happening with the cutter. My choice of H/C years ago was made based on this. I have heard all of the arguments for placing the cutter on the last flaps, and have never agreed with any of these arguments. In my opinion, the cutter of every (non pop top) rig should be under everything in the pack tray.

[BrianM 1]

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That graphics & marketing company with the www.aviacom.com domain name seems to have nothing to do with the Aviacom SA that has the argus-aad.com page and makes the Argus. Unless there's something in the background I don't know about.

whois argus-aad.com

Registrant Name: Karel Goorts

Registrant Organization: G.V.C. BVBA

Registrant Address: Leemveldstraat 42

Registrant Address2: 

Registrant City: Overijse

Registrant State/Province: 

Registrant Country/Economy: BE

Registrant Postal Code: 3090

Registrant Phone: +32.27850280

Registrant Fax: 

Registrant Email: [email protected]


Administrative Name: Karel Goorts

Administrative Organization: G.V.C. BVBA

Administrative Address: Leemveldstraat 42

Administrative Address2: 

Administrative City: Overijse

Administrative State/Province: 

Administrative Country/Economy: BE

Administrative Postal Code: 3090

Administrative Phone: +32.27850280

Administrative Fax: 

Administrative Email: [email protected]


Technical Name: Hannes Van de Vel

Technical Organization: Connexeon bvba

Technical Address: Neerlandweg 17

Technical Address2: 

Technical City: Antwerpen Wilrijk

Technical State/Province: 

Technical Country/Economy: BE

Technical Postal Code: 2610

Technical Phone: +32.33693333

Technical Fax: +32.33693334

Technical Email: [email protected]


Name Server: be1.ns.connexeon.net

Name Server: nl1.ns.connexeon.nl

Name Server: be2.ns.connexeon.net

whois aviacom.com

Registrant Name: Karel GOORTS

Registrant Organization: AVIACOM NV

Registrant Address: Beekstraat 18

Registrant Address2: 

Registrant City: Zaventem

Registrant State/Province: 

Registrant Country/Economy: BE

Registrant Postal Code: 1930

Registrant Phone: +32.27850280

Registrant Fax: +32.27319798

Registrant Email: [email protected]


Administrative Name: Karel GOORTS

Administrative Organization: AVIACOM NV

Administrative Address: Beekstraat 18

Administrative Address2: 

Administrative City: Zaventem

Administrative State/Province: 

Administrative Country/Economy: BE

Administrative Postal Code: 1930

Administrative Phone: +32.27850280

Administrative Fax: +32.27319798

Administrative Email: [email protected]


Technical Name: Hannes Van de Vel

Technical Organization: Connexeon bvba

Technical Address: Neerlandweg 17

Technical Address2: 

Technical City: Antwerpen Wilrijk

Technical State/Province: 

Technical Country/Economy: BE

Technical Postal Code: 2610

Technical Phone: +32.33693333

Technical Fax: +32.33693334

Technical Email: [email protected]


Name Server: be1.ns.connexeon.net

Name Server: nl1.ns.connexeon.nl

Name Server: be2.ns.connexeon.net

"It's amazing what you can learn while you're not talking." - Skydivesg

[pchapman 261]

Thanks for the whois to provide the evidence, Brian.

[BrianM 1]

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Aviacom is a company that does 3D graphics, makes card readers, blue tooth devices and perfume bottles. It seems that the manufacture of AAD’s is a side line.

A google translation of their website says they do "Professional 3D modeling, animation, visualization and motion graphics".

I have the impression that they don't manufacture those card readers, blue tooth devices, and perfume bottles, but rather have done 3D modelling for the companies that do make them.

"It's amazing what you can learn while you're not talking." - Skydivesg

[mjosparky 3]

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That graphics & marketing company with the www.aviacom.com domain name seems to have nothing to do with the Aviacom SA that has the argus-aad.com page and makes the Argus. Unless there's something in the background I don't know about.

They are part of the same IP address.

http://www.flyaerodyne.com/fly/support.asp

Sparky

My idea of a fair fight is clubbing baby seals

[pchapman 261]

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NONE of the AAD manufacturers have a squeaky clean record and when my friend was almost killed by a cypres 2, and they failed to give him any reason, apology or any contact at all, makes me wonder how often thtis has happened and gone unoticed before.

My firends' Cypres 2 fired at 1000 feet minutes after deployment, his reserve deployed and just before landing went into downplane at 20 feet, he hit hard and ripped a new asshole.
[...]
SHAME ON AIRTEC for ignoring Andre and his request for answers. A simple sorry would have sufficed.

Hi Rhys and everyone:

OK, I've got some more information on this incident and how Airtec handled things. It doesn't mean they are perfect, but further info makes their actions seem much more reasonable than they might otherwise appear.

I've had discussions with Cliff Schmucker, and so Airtec has released a brand new statement about how the 2008 Cypres 2 recall came about.

1. Injury due to Cypres 2 inadvertent fire in 2006?

From information I have seen, it looks like the info that was passed on to Airtec was very limited. Someone involved in running the DZ contacted Airtec about getting a replacement unit right away, but mentioned no injury. It was in no way a full incident report. Even up until now the local Cypres dealer also understood that there was no injury. I also got in contact with another jumper at the DZ at the time, and he did say that the tandem instructor was sore from the landing.

I don't know if the instructor was sore for a day or a week, jumping or not jumping. But there was no serious injury, and no information about any injury of any type seems to have made it up the chain to Airtec. Thus in the 2008 Cypres 2 recall, Airtec was being honest, and not trying to cover anything up, when they stated that no injuries had occurred.

Clearly a two out has the potential to go seriously wrong.

(What I can't comment on is whether the instructor had any direct communications with anyone, and whether there may have been any breakdown in communication there.)

2. Circumstances of the 2008 recall

Airtec has written "Regarding the April 2008 CYPRES 2 Service Bulletin" and posted it on the Cypres-USA (SSK) site:

http://cypres-usa.com/April_2008_SB_letter_2011_03.pdf

Airtec explains the actions they took regarding an intermittent and rare issue with a sensor.

It looks like Airtec were the ones whose digging found the error, not the sensor company. So the sensor company didn't warn Airtec, rather it was the other way around.

There had been a claim from Vigil that after the sensor company announced the problem, Airtec did nothing for 15 months to tell their customers about the problem. Airtec seems to have believed that they had the situation under control, with the sensor imperfections having no practical effect, so there was nothing to warn about.

The sensor company had an oven problem which resulted in minor impurities in the sections of batches of silicon chips used to fabricate the pressure sensor. Sensors still passed the sensor company's requirements, and the Airtec tests, but statistical anomalies were found in one case. Airtec did further engineering work on the issue and decided that they didn't see any risk with the sensors already out in the field, even though they stopped production and replaced all those on hand as a precaution. Imperfections in the supplier's process wouldn't in practice cause any sensor problems.

Airtec admits that it worked out that they were wrong, for there were the 2 inadvertent firings in 2008, one on the ground and then one in the air as discussed above. While investigating the first incident, the second happened, and soon the recall was issued.

Perhaps they hadn't seen the full potential range of variation in sensor performance that could occur from the imperfect wafers.

One can debate what is "good" vs. "bad", but Airtec thought they still had "good" sensors out there, even if future ones would be "better". Despite a problem in an extreme lab test, the sensors wouldn't malfunction in actual use.

Only after units had worked fine in the field for over a year, then things went wrong and they recalled some AAD's from within about 6 months of production. I don't believe it was all AADs from that time period, as the center of the wafers were not contaminated and chips made from the centers would be OK.

People are still free to question how well Airtec evaluated the situation and reacted to it, whether they should have been even more cautious earlier. But they did seem to be thorough in evaluating the issues raised and acting when they thought necessary.

I think Airtec is learning that it would be even more trusted if it were a little more open about its actions.

(It's also interesting to see in the document how many of those recalled units never made it back to the factory, even after any in-service unit should have had its 4 year check done. I can't believe that all of those units are stuck in closets.)

[pchapman 261]

Below I am posting the letter that is supposed to be from Intersema, when they announced the sensor problem to their customers. According to Airtec, this came after Airtec assisted them in finding the problem.

The letter was posted by DOI previously, but since he was making a nuisance of himself and got himself banned like Rhys, a few of his recent threads about 'Airtec's lies' etc. got deleted. I can't find the Intersema letter anywhere else on dz.com so I'm adding it here as an apparent fact.

It is still valuable in discussions about the reliability & history of AAD's, even if I disagree with a lot of Rhys and DOI's beliefs and the way they went about publicizing those beliefs.

Quote

From: Hanspeter Salvisberg

Sent: 14 December 2006 09:17

To: 'name witheld'

Cc: Frédéric Piaget

Subject: Possible défaut du circuit intégré



Monsieur,

[Translated form French]

Vos commandes N° 10928594, 10927486, 10924299, MS5534-BM, v/code ZAVI+MS5534BM

We regret to inform you that the component above MS5534-BM, which was delivered to you in recent months, could be defective.

This defect results from a drift parameters of the integrated circuit, purchased from a subcontractor, which we use in our product MS5534-BM. Unfortunately we are unable to determine the failure rate and the exact date from which integrated circuits with this drift we have been delivered, because we do not yet have enough data. The defects occur only when certain conditions are met simultaneously

The module can malfunction MS5534-BM could occur if it is exposed to a temperature of about 50 ° C and fed continuously for a certain period of operation. The digital module defective returns 65535 ($ FFFF hex) outputs on both D1 and D2. In some cases, it can also stop communicating, that is to say, it gives no acknowledgment on DOUT after conversion. Failure can be caused by a diet high temperature (operating at 70 ° C for 3-5 days).


It is possible that this dysfunction has a minor impact on your products because we do not know what temperature your products are normally exposed. If the device is not under constant tension, that is to say, turn on and off, the failure rate is much lower and the integrated circuit are found stable state after some time


We immediately stopped the production of components related to the recognition of the problem and our supplier of integrated circuits has done the same.


Current status of deliveries:


We stopped manufacturing the MS5534-BM. We are currently replacing it with its predecessor, the MS5534-AM, until our contractor to ensure a proper operation of integrated circuits. We ask you to please check if you can use the version-AM (ROHS) instead of the version-BM. We assume that this should be the case since version replaces the version-BM-AM.


Since the cause of the fault is known, a joint team with our subcontractor redefines the manufacturing process of integrated circuits. We should be able to start delivery of the BM-version in February 2007. We will keep you informed of developments as soon as possible.


If you were to have applications for which our sensor is used at temperatures above 45 ° C (that is to say constantly energized at this temperature) we offer free replacement of all sensors delivered between June and November 2006. We recommend that you replace all the sensors with new sensors have passed additional tests. This is a service to ensure our image of a product of quality.

We sincerely regret this inconvenience and problems that we may well cause you involuntarily. Please accept, Madam, Sir, our sincere apologies.


Our team is at your disposal for any help or assistance you may need.


Thank you very much for your understanding.


Hans Peter Salvisberg

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Intersema Sensoric SA

CH-2022 Bevaix (Switzerland)

telephone +41 32 847 95 50

direct no +41 32 847 95 55

fax +41 32 847 95 69

E-mail [email protected]

Web page www.intersema.ch

[theonlyski 3]

Isn't the failure mode on the Cypres to shut off?

Seems like losing its altitude stream would cause it to die before it causes it to fire.

"I may be a dirty pirate hooker...but I'm not about to go stand on the corner." iluvtofly
DPH -7, TDS 578, Muff 5153, SCR 14890
I'm an asshole, and I approve this message

[swoopguy 0]

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Someone involved in running the DZ contacted Airtec about getting a replacement unit right away, but mentioned no injury. It was in no way a full incident report. Even up until now the local Cypres dealer also understood that there was no injury. I also got in contact with another jumper at the DZ at the time, and he did say that the tandem instructor was sore from the landing.

The instructor was badly bruised and his anus was torn so his faeces were coming out of two orifices ( one new ripped one) when he excreted. I would consider that an injury.

He was out of work for over a week.

Call it minor call it what you will but there were indeed injuries sustained.

It was discovered on these forums recently that there was not an incident report filed.

The APF have been contacted (again) to clarify the existence of an incident report.

They have failed to respond to that question after numerous emails.

Without an incident report, Airtec have no reason to conclude that no injuries were sustained (when in fact they were); their source of information has been proven to be unreliable.

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Clearly a two out has the potential to go seriously wrong.

Sure has, and it was only the instructor's skill that saved the pair from very serious injury.

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It looks like Airtec were the ones whose digging found the error, not the sensor company. So the sensor company didn't warn Airtec, rather it was the other way around.

It certainly does ‘look’ that way, though if you read the April 2008 publication carefully you will notice Airtec say they discovered the sensors failed by being exposed to high temperature 'after' the sensor manufacturer sent out the letter to their clients.

The letter from the manufacturer explains exactly the parameters that needed to be met in order for the units to malfunction.
That letter can be read in the post a couple above this one.

So Airtec's story once again, does not add up.

I have not seen anywhere at all where Airtec mention that their unit fired while under canopy, they do however go out of their way to mention that the other unit fired on the ground.

Before the impending flame session and Ad Hominem attacks ensue, please be aware that clarification is all I ask for.

If anyone has information to clarify the situation, it would me much appreciated.