Reading Incident Reports

[Marisan 0]

Interesting article on the psychology involved in reading Incident Reports.
Written for Pilots but still relevant for Skydivers.
Thanks to PPRUNE



What Can You Learn from Accident Reports?

by Gerry Binnema, Civil Aviation Safety Inspector, System Safety, Pacific Region, Civil Aviation, Transport Canada

A lot of people who work in aviation like to read accident reports. The reports serve as good reminders that aviation can be dangerous and that we always need to be vigilant. But if we were all being completely honest, sometimes we read them because it makes us feel smugly superior to the people who messed up. So, how much do we really learn from reading accident reports? Surprisingly, there has been very little research to see if accident reports actually have any positive effect on the people reading them. It seems very obvious that accident reports would be helpful, but there are a number of things that interfere with our ability to learn lessons from them.

Our brains process information and organize it before it is presented to our conscious attention. This processing follows certain relatively predictable patterns, which serve to help us understand the world around us. However, this processing can also distort our view of things, as information gets processed in such a way as to protect our self-esteem and our confidence. The patterns of processing that are very relevant to our understanding of accident reports are hindsight bias, attribution error, and invulnerability.

Readers will recall Heather Parker’s series of articles on the "new view" in the past three issues of the Aviation Safety Letter (ASL). In these articles, she described hindsight bias and attribution error. These concepts also apply when we are reading accident reports. By way of a brief review, hindsight bias refers to our tendency to look back at events and believe the events should have been predictable beforehand. A classic example of hindsight bias is the Monday-morning critique of the weekend’s sporting events by armchair athletes. The coach should have anticipated the other team’s strategy. They should have known that the goalie would get re-injured if they put him in so soon. In reality, as we try to anticipate what will happen next, there are many different potential outcomes and we make the best decision we can with the information that we have available. As we read an accident report, we already know how the flight ends, and so we tend to judge all the decisions that led up to the accident with hindsight bias, believing that the pilot should have known better.
Attribution error refers to our tendency to overestimate the contribution of personal factors when we observe other people’s errors. This means that when we see other people making a mistake, we tend to believe that their errors are a result of their own inadequacies (ignorance, incompetence, laziness), rather than a result of situational factors. Even when a situation arises over which the pilot had no control, we still tend to believe that they were at fault for allowing themselves to get into that situation.

Invulnerability refers to our tendency to believe that bad things will not happen to us. Of course, there are hazards all around us, so in order to enjoy life we suppress our fear and deny the possibility that anything will happen. But an unrealistic sense of invulnerability actually places us in danger. Young people, especially males, have higher levels of invulnerability, and this can be observed in the number of accidental injuries and deaths among young males. A strong sense of invulnerability will prevent us from taking the lessons of an accident report to heart.

In combination, these three factors make it easy to read an accident report and learn very little. It would be almost natural to believe that the pilot should have known better, that their errors were caused by their own ignorance or incompetence, and that this kind of thing could never happen to you.

I recently had an opportunity to conduct some research to see if accident reports were having an impact on readers. Eighty-nine college aviation students participated in the study by completing a questionnaire, and then six weeks later reading an accident report and completing another questionnaire. The questionnaire was intended to measure invulnerability and attribution error.

The participants’ responses to the questions on invulnerability showed very clearly that they did not believe they could be in an accident. The participants also clearly demonstrated a willingness to place the entire responsibility for an accident on the pilot, even when a number of situational factors contributed to the accident. However, the most interesting finding was that there was a remarkably consistent, but small, decrease in the measures of invulnerability immediately after reading an accident report. This means that reading an accident report does have an impact on the reader and does help to make a pilot think about their vulnerability to an accident.

The participants read one of two accident reports. One was a typical accident report format, while the other was written in a narrative format, describing the unfolding events from the pilot’s perspective. Both report formats achieved the same level of change in invulnerability. However, the latter format was able to build sympathy for the pilot so that participants who read this style of report were more likely to believe that they could commit the same errors and be in a similar type of accident.
This is good news for those of us who read a lot of accident reports. It really does give us a more realistic sense of the fact that we could be in an accident if the wrong set of circumstances hit us. In addition, earlier research (see http://psy.otago.ac.nz/cogerg/Rememb...ses%20Past.pdf) conducted in New Zealand, and repeated here in Canada, demonstrates that we do recall lessons from accident reports while in flight. However, in order to make the most of these lessons, we need to keep some things in mind. Here are some practical suggestions for reading accident reports:

• Be aware of the fact that hindsight bias and attribution error do alter your perspective on an accident. As you read a report, think about how the unfolding events might have appeared to the pilot. Think about the decisions the pilot made, and try to ignore the fact that they resulted in an accident. Could you have made the same decisions? What circumstances might have led you to those decisions?

• Be aware of the fact that the majority of people have an unrealistically optimistic belief about the probability that they will be in an accident. Ask yourself if you are really being as cautious as you should be.

• Finally, as you read an accident report, remember that the pilot’s actions made sense to them at the time. If you cannot make sense of the actions, you do not understand the situation as the pilot understood it. Try to step into the pilot’s shoes and see if you can build sympathy for their predicament. Could you fall into the same trap? Could some external pressures or stresses cause you to behave in this way?

• If we all use this kind of strategy as we read accident reports, we are more likely to learn valuable lessons from them, and this may prove to be the critical piece of information in some future decision you need to make. In the next issue, I will look at how to apply these same ideas to the way organizations think

[Bodhisattva420 0]

People that feel invulnerable probably don't read the incident forums.

[normiss 620]

Much less the opinion of some Canadian that doesn't skydive.

[icevideot 0]

I would find this to be more plausible if incident reports had not changed so many of my procedures and thought processes over the years.

EG: slinks can break more easily than I would have thought possible so I inspect them more thoroughly

Not all low turn fatalities happen on small, highly loaded canopies

As well as too many small mistakes that you can get away with for years but now I know can possibly kill me

I just don't buy the "smug" angle as it is applied here. (Not among skydivers with any time in the sport anyway)

"... this ain't a Nerf world."

[Calvin19 0]

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Finally, as you read an accident report, remember that the pilot’s actions made sense to them at the time. If you cannot make sense of the actions, you do not understand the situation as the pilot understood it. Try to step into the pilot’s shoes and see if you can build sympathy for their predicament. Could you fall into the same trap? Could some external pressures or stresses cause you to behave in this way?

+1

[Bertt 0]

There's two ways to learn from experience. The cheap way is to learn from other people's experience. I read incident reports from several industries I'm involved in because I'm a cheapskate.

You don't have to outrun the bear.

[captain1976 0]

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Interesting article on the psychology involved in reading Incident Reports.
Written for Pilots but still relevant for Skydivers.
Thanks to PPRUNE

What Can You Learn from Accident Reports?

I recently had an opportunity to conduct some research to see if accident reports were having an impact on readers. Eighty-nine college aviation students participated in the study by completing a questionnaire, and then six weeks later reading an accident report and completing another questionnaire. The questionnaire was intended to measure invulnerability and attribution error.

The participants’ responses to the questions on invulnerability showed very clearly that they did not believe they could be in an accident.

___________________________________________________
I don’t think College students are a good source for a questionnaire study of invulnerability and attribution error.
College students probably average somewhere around 20 years of age, and the human brain which is able to recognize danger and form meaningful risk/benefit decisions is not fully formed until about 25.

Additionally, candidates 18 to 20 years of age were chosen as the prime age for fighter and bomber pilots in WWII.
Though 25, 30 and even older age groups were known to have made better pilots, with this older age comes a great deal more thought in regards to mortality. An attitude which places importance on preservation doesn’t do the military a lot of good in wartime.

You live more in the few minutes of skydiving than many people live in their lifetime

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[brenthutch 383]

I agree, I was not smug, just oblivious when I first started skydiving. I read the Indentent Reports and thought: "sucks for him he f**d up. Wont happen to me" But after a few years and more tha a few close calls I took the reports to heart. If I understood then what I know now....I would have grounded myself

[jsaxton 0]

Very good points IMHO

[murps2000 86]

I agree, I was not smug, just oblivious when I first started skydiving. I read the Indentent Reports and thought: "sucks for him he f**d up. Wont happen to me" But after a few years and more tha a few close calls I took the reports to heart. If I understood then what I know now....I would have grounded myself ***

My, how time can change a man. Would you still have told me ten years ago that my spectre 190 was a dangerously underloaded canopy? Hadda ask.

[dninness 4]

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There's two ways to learn from experience. The cheap way is to learn from other people's experience. I read incident reports from several industries I'm involved in because I'm a cheapskate.

Whats that old joke? Learn from other people's mistakes, because you won't live long enough to make all of them yourself.

NIN
D-19617, AFF-I '19

[riggerrob 558]

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Much less the opinion of some Canadian that doesn't skydive.

"

......................................................................

Be careful who you put down.
His logic is sound ... as sound as the logic of a Canadian who does not pond swoop?????

I don't jump sub-100 square foot canopies because I have read far too many accident reports about guys who hurt themselves jumping sub-100 square foot canopies.

Rob Warner
6,300 jumps total, including 4,300 tandems
FAA Master Rigger, etc.

[RaXz 0]

Great article!

Grain of salt opinion follows:

I can sometimes feel that smugness creep onto me, I count myself lucky that I love the psychological aspect of the sport too. I try to guard myself from that kind of mentality, I rather look up onto things with an open mind.

In my eyes it's the same danger as getting complacent, I am almost hitting that number now. When I am about to jump, I think to myself that it could be my last jump, just to accept that possibility, it keeps me on a edge. Of course, I try to balance more to a optimistic state of mind, but I don't want to loose my sight on the negative side of things, lest it bites me in the bottom.

It's just like when I was a kid, I thought myself as invulnerable, until shit hit the fan a couple of times. It's better to realise that upfront instead of getting reality to learn you a lesson.

[riggerpaul 1]

Very interesting.

Though I don't pilot airplanes anymore, I've read my share of airplane accident reports. Of coure, I read all the skydiving accident reports that I can.

I do notice that I have different reactions to the two different reports. I've never really wondered why until now.

My theory is that since the content of the two different reports is so different, my reactions are similarly different.

Aviation accident reports are usually quite detailed, and generally include a clear list of causes. It is usually pretty easy to look at the list and note that each one is something I would never likely have done. It is also quite likely that the conditions of the flight are such that you figure that you would never have made that flight in the first place.

Skydiving accidents are, IMHO, vastly different. The causes are not usually as clear, and it is often a lot easier to see how one could get oneself into a similar situation. There's a lot more left to think about without clear explanation.

There seems to be a lot less separating me from the accident in the skydiving reports. Skydiving reports are a lot "closer to home", and get a different quality of attention.