pchapman 261
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Phil1111 910
Got this in my eMail this morning. It's not me.
After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.
One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.
We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.
This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.
Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).
This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!
The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.
The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!
Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.
Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.
So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.
__________________
http://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/75814-asiana-777-crash-sfo-38.html
A guide to crash speak
The more complicated planes get, the harder it is to fly them. There are more ways for pilots both to mess up and to compensate for their mess-ups, and there are more dials, flashing lights, and doodads for them to keep watch on. That said, there are a few basic principles of flying that apply to the Asiana crash, principles that might be obscured by some of the aviation lingo that's being thrown around. I'm not a pilot, and so I write only as an interested observer who is, himself, trying to understand what happened. My own definitions may not be precise enough for the FAA or Cockpit Confidential, but I hope they help explain some of the concepts.
First, a few words: Associate pitch with moving up or down, the "stick" with pitch, yaw with left or right horizontal movement, rudders with yaw, and thrust with force and speed.
How important was it that the glideslope wasn't working?
It's not an easy question. Potentially, very important — if the pilot really, really preferred to use this method. But practically, probably not. A glideslope refers to a beam of energy that's part of the Instrument Landing System and keeps a plane on a vertical descent line. When cleared by the tower for an ILS approach to a runway, you tune your plane to the frequency of the glideslope emission; you adjust your speed, using the throttle, and pitch, using the stick, to keep the glideslope line as close to the center-line of an indicator display in the cockpit as you can. Another beam provides lateral guidance, so you're using your rudder pedals to slightly adjust the yaw to keep the line as close to the horizontal center-line in the same indicator display. If the lines stay tight, you'll land precisely in the touchdown zone of the runway, which is usually about 1,000 feet in from the threshold, or the start, of the runway.
That's how planes land in bad weather. For most ILS approaches, though, the pilot has to make a decision at some point close to the ground. Regardless of what his instruments are showing, can she see the touchdown zone, enough of the runway, and the runway lights? This "threshold" changes depending on the runway, but it's usually between 300 and 500 feet, which will give the pilot enough time, if she doesn't see anything because it's too rainy, snowy, foggy or cloudy, to declare a "missed approach," throttle up, retract most of the drag-inducing flaps, and then retract the runway gear, and pitch up.
So how did the pilots know how to stay on the right path?
On a clear day with no visual distortions, there are other ways for a pilot to know if he's flying the correct approach path. Runway 28L had a functioning PAPI, or Precision Approach Path Indicator. The PAPI is a series of lights set to one side of the runway threshold. It doesn't matter precisely where. The angle at which the pilot's eyes catch the PAPI is key: if the pilot is on the correct glidepath, he will see two yellow lights next to two red lights. If the pilot is coming in high, he'll see three yellow lights and one red light. If he's coming in too low, he'll see three red lights next to one yellow light. If you're coming in too low, it means that you need to increase the ground speed of the plane relative to the rate of descent, so you push the throttle forward a bit, or perhaps adjust the pitch. If you're coming in too high, you ease back on the throttle or change the angle of the plane relative to the descent, pitching up a little. In any event, when you see the two-two configuration, you're good.
Is that the only way for a pilot to tell if she's going to land at the right spot?
No. Look at the landing threshold. It should be, relative to the rest of the stuff in your band of vision, at the same place it was when you first saw it. It'll get bigger and bigger, and bigger and bigger, but it won't move. Is that's the case, your ground speed is sufficient to land in the touchdown zone properly. So there were at least two cues — one electronic, and one visual, that the pilots were relying on.
What does it mean that the "speed" was too slow? How would they know what the right speed was?
The way you get a plane in the air is to generate enough thrust to overcome its weight, so that the thrust plus the weight of air itself is higher than the weight of the plane. The way you get a plane to land is to reverse the process that generates the thrust. This does not mean that you lower the power and point the nose toward the ground. It's kind of complex, because you want to land at a specific spot, like, say, on a runway, where you can burn off all the excessive energy that the plane has in a way that doesn't kill anyone or wreck the thing. The way to do this properly is to calculate a descent rate from a particular spot close to the runway threshold. The descent rate depends upon the weight of the airplane, because it represents the safest, slowest possible speed that the plane can lose its thrust, stay on an angle, and maintain control. Pilots will know that they'll need to land with a specific approach speed. Air Traffic Control will give them time to reduce their speed slowly; obviously, a plane can't fly at 300 knots until two miles out and then suddenly hope to slow down to between 150 and 160 knots right at the runway threshold without something going wrong. Usually, planes step down their speeds and altitudes gently, and are given several miles to set up their approaches — both the speed (the groundspeed, not the airspeed) and the angle (the glideslope). Generally, a plane's approach speed is a relative constant. The airframe accounts for a set weight, but variations in fuel aboard, the passenger count, the tailwinds on the ground and even the temperature can push the number higher or lower. The pilots and their dispatches can calculate the figure very quickly if conditions rapidly change. But they can't and never do ballpark the figure.
So how do pilots stay at the exact speed?
They adjust the thrust and the pitch of their aircraft. Generally, pilots will turn on the "autothrottle," and will use one of their several autopilots to set the speed. The plane, in theory, will then automatically adjust the throttle to make sure the speed is constant on the approach. Of course, the autopilots can't violate the laws of physics. Pilots themselves have to make sure the plane is within a certain set of physical parameters in order for the autopilot to work properly. Some pilots like to manually adjust the throttle to maintain the speed; some don't. And right before landing, the autopilot has to be disengaged because the plane is supposed to touch down and then slow down, something it can't do if the plane itself wants to keep the speed constant. (Some autopilots automatically disengage at a certain height). For all the talk of how "planes land themselves," pilots are the ones who decide when to disengage the autopilot and when to retard the throttle to idle, and how and when to begin the "flare" — which is that nose-up maneuver that both increases drag, slows down the plane, and allows the aircraft to touch down on its rear wheels as gently as possible. (Some planes can land themselves; these "category 3 ILS approaches" are still kind of rare, because airports have to be certified for them, pilots have to be trained extensively for them, and a lot of people still can't get over the idea of letting a plane decide when to cut off the autothrottle and automatically pitch up.)
What happens when the autothrottle is disengaged and the pilot must increase speed before the plane is over the runway?
Once the autothrottles have been disengaged, a pilot efficiently increases speed during landing by
(a) keeping the pitch constant and adding more thrust to the engines,
(b) and then very slowly adjusting the pitch down as the added thrust kicks in to make sure the plane's altitude aligns with the visual cues or ILS glidescope as necessary.
Problem is, if you're trying to do this 10 seconds from touchdown, the plane is usually not going to respond as quickly as you need it to.
If the pilot lowers the nose first, the altitude will drop before the speed increases, so pilots are instructed, generally, to not adjust the pitch of their aircraft when they're trying to make sure they're on a proper path to land until the plane has begun to speed up. The last thing these Asiana pilots needed to do was to go lower faster.
By the way, human instincts would have you pull back on the stick as soon as you can, because up is up, but pitching up quickly during landing will not increase the altitude quickly enough and will decrease speed too quickly. Pitch up, speed down. Pitch down, speed up. And when you're landing or taking off, the relative effects of these actions will differ too.
What's this about a "go-around?" Why didn't the pilots do this "go-around" thing if whatever they were doing wasn't right?
The latter question is hard to answer; perhaps the pilots genuinely did not notice they were in trouble until it was too late. For the most part, though, if a plane is more than 15 seconds from touching down, it can safely and seamlessly execute a go-around maneuver. The flaps and slats — the thingies that extend from the wings during takeoff and landing — are retracted to a takeoff posture; the throttle is pushed up; then the plane pitches up slightly; once positive climb (i.e., it's going up) has been established, then the pilots will retract the landing gear. Every runway comes with its own "missed approach fix," which is where a plane knows to go automatically if it can't stick the landing. Before landing, a pilot will input the height of that fix, usually around 3,000 feet, into an autopilot computer. It won't be activated, though. (Each plane you fly has at least two these days, two separate autopilots). The pilot flying the plane relies on his or her co-pilot to look at the electronic landing cues and instruments to make sure that the plane is on track for a landing. He or she is ready to perform the final landing maneuvers (see below), or switch gears and do a "TO/GA." What a cool button this is. It basically tells the plane to ignore everything, including the autopilots, and increase the throttle as quickly as possible. Once the engines have spooled up, a process that can take anywhere between eight and 10 seconds, then the pilot not flying might activate the autopilot with the missed-approach height setting.
http://theweek.com/article/index/246611/a-guide-to-crash-speak
After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.
One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.
We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.
This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.
Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).
This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!
The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.
The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!
Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.
Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.
So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.
__________________
http://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/75814-asiana-777-crash-sfo-38.html
A guide to crash speak
The more complicated planes get, the harder it is to fly them. There are more ways for pilots both to mess up and to compensate for their mess-ups, and there are more dials, flashing lights, and doodads for them to keep watch on. That said, there are a few basic principles of flying that apply to the Asiana crash, principles that might be obscured by some of the aviation lingo that's being thrown around. I'm not a pilot, and so I write only as an interested observer who is, himself, trying to understand what happened. My own definitions may not be precise enough for the FAA or Cockpit Confidential, but I hope they help explain some of the concepts.
First, a few words: Associate pitch with moving up or down, the "stick" with pitch, yaw with left or right horizontal movement, rudders with yaw, and thrust with force and speed.
How important was it that the glideslope wasn't working?
It's not an easy question. Potentially, very important — if the pilot really, really preferred to use this method. But practically, probably not. A glideslope refers to a beam of energy that's part of the Instrument Landing System and keeps a plane on a vertical descent line. When cleared by the tower for an ILS approach to a runway, you tune your plane to the frequency of the glideslope emission; you adjust your speed, using the throttle, and pitch, using the stick, to keep the glideslope line as close to the center-line of an indicator display in the cockpit as you can. Another beam provides lateral guidance, so you're using your rudder pedals to slightly adjust the yaw to keep the line as close to the horizontal center-line in the same indicator display. If the lines stay tight, you'll land precisely in the touchdown zone of the runway, which is usually about 1,000 feet in from the threshold, or the start, of the runway.
That's how planes land in bad weather. For most ILS approaches, though, the pilot has to make a decision at some point close to the ground. Regardless of what his instruments are showing, can she see the touchdown zone, enough of the runway, and the runway lights? This "threshold" changes depending on the runway, but it's usually between 300 and 500 feet, which will give the pilot enough time, if she doesn't see anything because it's too rainy, snowy, foggy or cloudy, to declare a "missed approach," throttle up, retract most of the drag-inducing flaps, and then retract the runway gear, and pitch up.
So how did the pilots know how to stay on the right path?
On a clear day with no visual distortions, there are other ways for a pilot to know if he's flying the correct approach path. Runway 28L had a functioning PAPI, or Precision Approach Path Indicator. The PAPI is a series of lights set to one side of the runway threshold. It doesn't matter precisely where. The angle at which the pilot's eyes catch the PAPI is key: if the pilot is on the correct glidepath, he will see two yellow lights next to two red lights. If the pilot is coming in high, he'll see three yellow lights and one red light. If he's coming in too low, he'll see three red lights next to one yellow light. If you're coming in too low, it means that you need to increase the ground speed of the plane relative to the rate of descent, so you push the throttle forward a bit, or perhaps adjust the pitch. If you're coming in too high, you ease back on the throttle or change the angle of the plane relative to the descent, pitching up a little. In any event, when you see the two-two configuration, you're good.
Is that the only way for a pilot to tell if she's going to land at the right spot?
No. Look at the landing threshold. It should be, relative to the rest of the stuff in your band of vision, at the same place it was when you first saw it. It'll get bigger and bigger, and bigger and bigger, but it won't move. Is that's the case, your ground speed is sufficient to land in the touchdown zone properly. So there were at least two cues — one electronic, and one visual, that the pilots were relying on.
What does it mean that the "speed" was too slow? How would they know what the right speed was?
The way you get a plane in the air is to generate enough thrust to overcome its weight, so that the thrust plus the weight of air itself is higher than the weight of the plane. The way you get a plane to land is to reverse the process that generates the thrust. This does not mean that you lower the power and point the nose toward the ground. It's kind of complex, because you want to land at a specific spot, like, say, on a runway, where you can burn off all the excessive energy that the plane has in a way that doesn't kill anyone or wreck the thing. The way to do this properly is to calculate a descent rate from a particular spot close to the runway threshold. The descent rate depends upon the weight of the airplane, because it represents the safest, slowest possible speed that the plane can lose its thrust, stay on an angle, and maintain control. Pilots will know that they'll need to land with a specific approach speed. Air Traffic Control will give them time to reduce their speed slowly; obviously, a plane can't fly at 300 knots until two miles out and then suddenly hope to slow down to between 150 and 160 knots right at the runway threshold without something going wrong. Usually, planes step down their speeds and altitudes gently, and are given several miles to set up their approaches — both the speed (the groundspeed, not the airspeed) and the angle (the glideslope). Generally, a plane's approach speed is a relative constant. The airframe accounts for a set weight, but variations in fuel aboard, the passenger count, the tailwinds on the ground and even the temperature can push the number higher or lower. The pilots and their dispatches can calculate the figure very quickly if conditions rapidly change. But they can't and never do ballpark the figure.
So how do pilots stay at the exact speed?
They adjust the thrust and the pitch of their aircraft. Generally, pilots will turn on the "autothrottle," and will use one of their several autopilots to set the speed. The plane, in theory, will then automatically adjust the throttle to make sure the speed is constant on the approach. Of course, the autopilots can't violate the laws of physics. Pilots themselves have to make sure the plane is within a certain set of physical parameters in order for the autopilot to work properly. Some pilots like to manually adjust the throttle to maintain the speed; some don't. And right before landing, the autopilot has to be disengaged because the plane is supposed to touch down and then slow down, something it can't do if the plane itself wants to keep the speed constant. (Some autopilots automatically disengage at a certain height). For all the talk of how "planes land themselves," pilots are the ones who decide when to disengage the autopilot and when to retard the throttle to idle, and how and when to begin the "flare" — which is that nose-up maneuver that both increases drag, slows down the plane, and allows the aircraft to touch down on its rear wheels as gently as possible. (Some planes can land themselves; these "category 3 ILS approaches" are still kind of rare, because airports have to be certified for them, pilots have to be trained extensively for them, and a lot of people still can't get over the idea of letting a plane decide when to cut off the autothrottle and automatically pitch up.)
What happens when the autothrottle is disengaged and the pilot must increase speed before the plane is over the runway?
Once the autothrottles have been disengaged, a pilot efficiently increases speed during landing by
(a) keeping the pitch constant and adding more thrust to the engines,
(b) and then very slowly adjusting the pitch down as the added thrust kicks in to make sure the plane's altitude aligns with the visual cues or ILS glidescope as necessary.
Problem is, if you're trying to do this 10 seconds from touchdown, the plane is usually not going to respond as quickly as you need it to.
If the pilot lowers the nose first, the altitude will drop before the speed increases, so pilots are instructed, generally, to not adjust the pitch of their aircraft when they're trying to make sure they're on a proper path to land until the plane has begun to speed up. The last thing these Asiana pilots needed to do was to go lower faster.
By the way, human instincts would have you pull back on the stick as soon as you can, because up is up, but pitching up quickly during landing will not increase the altitude quickly enough and will decrease speed too quickly. Pitch up, speed down. Pitch down, speed up. And when you're landing or taking off, the relative effects of these actions will differ too.
What's this about a "go-around?" Why didn't the pilots do this "go-around" thing if whatever they were doing wasn't right?
The latter question is hard to answer; perhaps the pilots genuinely did not notice they were in trouble until it was too late. For the most part, though, if a plane is more than 15 seconds from touching down, it can safely and seamlessly execute a go-around maneuver. The flaps and slats — the thingies that extend from the wings during takeoff and landing — are retracted to a takeoff posture; the throttle is pushed up; then the plane pitches up slightly; once positive climb (i.e., it's going up) has been established, then the pilots will retract the landing gear. Every runway comes with its own "missed approach fix," which is where a plane knows to go automatically if it can't stick the landing. Before landing, a pilot will input the height of that fix, usually around 3,000 feet, into an autopilot computer. It won't be activated, though. (Each plane you fly has at least two these days, two separate autopilots). The pilot flying the plane relies on his or her co-pilot to look at the electronic landing cues and instruments to make sure that the plane is on track for a landing. He or she is ready to perform the final landing maneuvers (see below), or switch gears and do a "TO/GA." What a cool button this is. It basically tells the plane to ignore everything, including the autopilots, and increase the throttle as quickly as possible. Once the engines have spooled up, a process that can take anywhere between eight and 10 seconds, then the pilot not flying might activate the autopilot with the missed-approach height setting.
http://theweek.com/article/index/246611/a-guide-to-crash-speak
rwieder 0
At last! Something we both agree on.
Best-
Richard
Best-
Richard
Opie 0
I still expect someone to show up shortly and jump up and down screaming it's not the pilots fault!!! You people just don't know anything about flying! 
ChrisD 0
WASHINGTON — The Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l, released the following statement regarding the crash landing of Asiana Flight 214 in San Francisco on Saturday, July 6, 2013.
The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), as the largest nongovernmental safety organization in the world, continues to monitor the accident investigation of Asiana 214 and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)’s ill-advised release of partial data in the aftermath of this tragedy.
The NTSB’s release of incomplete, out-of-context information has fueled rampant speculation about the cause of the accident. The field phase of the investigation is barely three days old, and the pilots on the flight deck, at the controls of the aircraft, had little opportunity to provide vital information as to what exactly happened during the event before disclosing data recorded during the last moments of the flight.
In the interest of providing context to the information already disclosed, ALPA calls on the NTSB to, at the very least, elaborate on factual material that has been excluded from public releases but must be considered in determining not only what happened, but why.
For example:
•
Why was the Instrument Landing System (ILS), a critical aid to pilots, out of service?
•
In the absence of the ILS, was an alternate space-based navigation capability, such as Required Navigation Performance (RNP), available and in use?
•
Were other aids to accurate vertical positioning, such as the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights, functional, and if not, why not?
•
Was the crew using onboard aids such as Vertical Navigation (VNAV) to determine a precise vertical path?
•
Did the crew’s training include proper use of all these capabilities?
•
What were the indications shown on the flight instruments available to the pilots, and how did this information compare to what was recorded?
These are just some of the critical questions that need to be investigated in order to determine the entire chain of events leading to the accident. Without the full body of facts surrounding a catastrophic event, partial or incomplete information can lead to erroneous conclusions and, in turn, skew the perception of individuals’ behavior. This could then lead to misguided assessments of the crew’s intentions and actions.
ALPA calls on the international aviation community, including our government and industry safety partners around the world, to redouble its efforts to gather the full body of factual knowledge necessary and release that information accordingly.
Only then can the global safety community be able to identify potential hazards and continue to make safety improvements in every aspect of the aviation system.
Founded in 1931, ALPA is the world’s largest pilots union, representing more than 50,000 pilots at 33 airlines in the United States and Canada.
C
This still applies...
The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), as the largest nongovernmental safety organization in the world, continues to monitor the accident investigation of Asiana 214 and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)’s ill-advised release of partial data in the aftermath of this tragedy.
The NTSB’s release of incomplete, out-of-context information has fueled rampant speculation about the cause of the accident. The field phase of the investigation is barely three days old, and the pilots on the flight deck, at the controls of the aircraft, had little opportunity to provide vital information as to what exactly happened during the event before disclosing data recorded during the last moments of the flight.
In the interest of providing context to the information already disclosed, ALPA calls on the NTSB to, at the very least, elaborate on factual material that has been excluded from public releases but must be considered in determining not only what happened, but why.
For example:
•
Why was the Instrument Landing System (ILS), a critical aid to pilots, out of service?
•
In the absence of the ILS, was an alternate space-based navigation capability, such as Required Navigation Performance (RNP), available and in use?
•
Were other aids to accurate vertical positioning, such as the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights, functional, and if not, why not?
•
Was the crew using onboard aids such as Vertical Navigation (VNAV) to determine a precise vertical path?
•
Did the crew’s training include proper use of all these capabilities?
•
What were the indications shown on the flight instruments available to the pilots, and how did this information compare to what was recorded?
These are just some of the critical questions that need to be investigated in order to determine the entire chain of events leading to the accident. Without the full body of facts surrounding a catastrophic event, partial or incomplete information can lead to erroneous conclusions and, in turn, skew the perception of individuals’ behavior. This could then lead to misguided assessments of the crew’s intentions and actions.
ALPA calls on the international aviation community, including our government and industry safety partners around the world, to redouble its efforts to gather the full body of factual knowledge necessary and release that information accordingly.
Only then can the global safety community be able to identify potential hazards and continue to make safety improvements in every aspect of the aviation system.
Founded in 1931, ALPA is the world’s largest pilots union, representing more than 50,000 pilots at 33 airlines in the United States and Canada.
C
This still applies...
But what do I know, "I only have one tandem jump."
JohnMitchell 14
***The NTSB’s release of incomplete, out-of-context information has fueled rampant speculation about the cause of the accident.
The ILS is only "critical" in very bad weather. It was CAVU at the time of the crash. And we keep telling you this: ILS's are taken down all the time for maintenance. An aviation expert such as yourself should be familiar with this.Quote
Why was the Instrument Landing System (ILS), a critical aid to pilots, out of service?
Was there any GPS interference at the time?QuoteIn the absence of the ILS, was an alternate space-based navigation capability, such as Required Navigation Performance (RNP), available and in use?
I, too, would like to know if the PAPI was working. I didn't see it Notam'd out, did you?QuoteWere other aids to accurate vertical positioning, such as the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights, functional, and if not, why not?
Dunno, you should ask them. It still seems like they got behind the curve and let the plane get too low and too slow.QuoteWas the crew using onboard aids such as Vertical Navigation (VNAV) to determine a precise vertical path?
Sure. And the FULL investigation is still going on. No one is closing the books yet. In a year or so we'll have all the details. But in the meantime, this one is walking and quacking like a duck. Quit saying it's an anteater.QuoteDid the crew’s training include proper use of all these capabilities?
These are just some of the critical questions that need to be investigated in order to determine the entire chain of events leading to the accident.
ryoder 1,384
JohnMitchellI, too, would like to know if the PAPI was working. I didn't see it Notam'd out, did you?
A summary article I read yesterday stated it was operational...until Flt 214 took it out.
That was what generated the NOTAM on it after the crash.
"There are only three things of value: younger women, faster airplanes, and bigger crocodiles" - Arthur Jones.
JohnMitchell 14
Thanks, gotcha. 
3mpire 0
what a great read, thanks for sharing
normiss 622
NTSB said today "All flight controls were functioning normally"
I see a couple of pilots going down.
But they won't let the passengers evacuate!
I see a couple of pilots going down.
But they won't let the passengers evacuate!
ryoder 1,384
normissNTSB said today "All flight controls were functioning normally"
I see a couple of pilots going down.
But they won't let the passengers evacuate!
I don't get the stupid delay on evacuation.
What? Did they think they could restart the engines and taxi to the terminal?
"There are only three things of value: younger women, faster airplanes, and bigger crocodiles" - Arthur Jones.
quade 3
ryoder***NTSB said today "All flight controls were functioning normally"
I see a couple of pilots going down.
But they won't let the passengers evacuate!
I don't get the stupid delay on evacuation.
What? Did they think they could restart the engines and taxi to the terminal?
The ONLY thing justifiable would be if they were in the process of checking for fires and which side of the aircraft may or may not be safe to open.
Anything besides that would be ridiculous.
quade -
The World's Most Boring Skydiver
The World's Most Boring Skydiver
billvon 2,396
.thumb.jpg.4bb795e2eaf21b8b300039a5e1ec7f92.jpg)
>Why was the Instrument Landing System (ILS), a critical aid to pilots, out of service?
It was probably broken.
>Were other aids to accurate vertical positioning, such as the Precision Approach Path
>Indicator (PAPI) lights, functional, and if not, why not?
PAPI/VASI were working until they took them out.
>Was the crew using onboard aids such as Vertical Navigation (VNAV) to determine a
>precise vertical path?
Good question. We should ask them.
>Did the crew’s training include proper use of all these capabilities?
Also good question. But one thing we know is that every pilot on the planet is taught to be able to land an airplane by looking out the windscreen. Under no conditions is it acceptable to land an aircraft short of the runway if they can see that runway.
It was probably broken.
>Were other aids to accurate vertical positioning, such as the Precision Approach Path
>Indicator (PAPI) lights, functional, and if not, why not?
PAPI/VASI were working until they took them out.
>Was the crew using onboard aids such as Vertical Navigation (VNAV) to determine a
>precise vertical path?
Good question. We should ask them.
>Did the crew’s training include proper use of all these capabilities?
Also good question. But one thing we know is that every pilot on the planet is taught to be able to land an airplane by looking out the windscreen. Under no conditions is it acceptable to land an aircraft short of the runway if they can see that runway.
Phil1111 910
Asiana 214 Pilot Hints At Autothrottle Confusion
By John Croft [email protected]
July 09, 2013
The instructor pilot in command of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 arriving into San Francisco on July 6 said he had assumed the aircraft’s autothrottle system would keep the aircraft flying at 137 kt. as he and the “pilot-flying” in the left seat guided the 777-200ER to Runway 28L in visual conditions.
Too low and slow on the approach, the aircraft clipped the sea wall leading to the runway threshold with its main landing gear and tail as the pilots attempted to abort the landing. The left-seat pilot was in the process of getting qualified to fly the 777 for the Seoul, South Korea-based airline.
During interviews with the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, Korean investigators and the airline on July 8 and 9, the instructor pilot told officials that the aircraft was “slightly high” when it descended through 4,000 ft. on the approach. He then set the aircraft’s vertical speed mode for a 1,500 ft./min. descent rate, NTSB chairman Deborah Hersman said at a July 9 report on the investigation. During a July 8 update, Hersman said the pilots disconnected the aircraft’s autopilot at 1,600 ft., presumably to hand-fly the approach.
The instructor pilot told investigators that at 500 ft. altitude, he realized the aircraft was below the visual glideslope provided by the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) lights on the airport, since the system showed three red and one white light. When on the proper glideslope, pilots see two white and two red lights. All red indicates a position significantly below the glideslope while all white lights indicate being well above the reference glideslope. The electronic glideslope generally used as part of an instrument landing system was not operating due to runway construction at the airport this summer.
“He told [the left-seat] pilot to pull back [on the control wheel],” says Hersman of the interview. “He had set the speed at 137 kt. and assumed the autothrottles were maintaining the speed.” Autothrottles, if armed and turned on, will automatically increase or decrease engine thrust to maintain a preset speed, in this case 137 kt., the reference landing speed for the 777-200ER that day. The NTSB is investigating why the autothrottle did not work as the instructor had expected, an issue that could include mode confusion related to the interaction of various auto-flight modes.
Hersman says investigators documenting switch positions is the cockpit after the crash noted that the autothrottles were armed. In that state, the system will automatically activate when speeds are low regardless of whether pilots have the autothrottle system turned on or off.
Preliminary data from the aircraft’s flight data recorder shows that the speed had already decayed to 134 kt. as the aircraft passed through 500 ft., and would ultimately drop as low as 103 kt. at 3 sec. before impact.
The 777 continued to slow as the pilots attempted to “correct a lateral deviation” as it descended from 500 ft. to 200 ft. “At 200 ft., the four PAPIs were red and the airspeed was in the hatched area,” says Hersman. The “hatched” markings on an airspeed tape warn pilots of an impending stall. The instructor pilot at that point recognized that the autothrottle was not maintaining speed and established a nose-high go-around attitude. He attempted to push the throttles forward for more power, but says the pilot-flying had already done so.
Information from the flight data recorder showed that the pilots first increased engine power from flight idle at 125 ft. altitude, reaching 50% thrust 3 sec. before impact.
The pilots said that after impact, the aircraft “ballooned”, yawed left and went into a 360-degree spin, according to Hersman.
The left-seat pilot was mid-way through the airline’s initial operating experience phase for becoming qualified as a 777 crewmember, a process that requires 20 flights and 60 hr. of flight time with an instructor pilot, according to Hersman. He had completed 10 legs and 35 hr. of flight time.
Hersman says three of the four pilots were on the flight deck at the time of the crash. In addition to the pilot-flying and the instructor pilot, a relief first officer was in the jump seat. The relief captain was in the main cabin. Relief pilots fly the cruise portion of a flight.
This flight was the instructor pilot’s first mission as an instructor pilot, and it was also his first time flying with the left-seat pilot.
Hersman says none of the pilots were given drug or alcohol tests after the accident, a requirement for U.S.-based airline crews but no so for foreign airlines.
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_07_09_2013_p0-595503.xml
It has been extensively reported that the target airspeed(final approach speed) Vref, the landing reference speed was 137kn. Most pilots and airline flight procedures use a Vref +5 company mandated policy, plus in some cases Vref +5, plus 1/2 wind gusts.
By John Croft [email protected]
July 09, 2013
The instructor pilot in command of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 arriving into San Francisco on July 6 said he had assumed the aircraft’s autothrottle system would keep the aircraft flying at 137 kt. as he and the “pilot-flying” in the left seat guided the 777-200ER to Runway 28L in visual conditions.
Too low and slow on the approach, the aircraft clipped the sea wall leading to the runway threshold with its main landing gear and tail as the pilots attempted to abort the landing. The left-seat pilot was in the process of getting qualified to fly the 777 for the Seoul, South Korea-based airline.
During interviews with the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, Korean investigators and the airline on July 8 and 9, the instructor pilot told officials that the aircraft was “slightly high” when it descended through 4,000 ft. on the approach. He then set the aircraft’s vertical speed mode for a 1,500 ft./min. descent rate, NTSB chairman Deborah Hersman said at a July 9 report on the investigation. During a July 8 update, Hersman said the pilots disconnected the aircraft’s autopilot at 1,600 ft., presumably to hand-fly the approach.
The instructor pilot told investigators that at 500 ft. altitude, he realized the aircraft was below the visual glideslope provided by the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) lights on the airport, since the system showed three red and one white light. When on the proper glideslope, pilots see two white and two red lights. All red indicates a position significantly below the glideslope while all white lights indicate being well above the reference glideslope. The electronic glideslope generally used as part of an instrument landing system was not operating due to runway construction at the airport this summer.
“He told [the left-seat] pilot to pull back [on the control wheel],” says Hersman of the interview. “He had set the speed at 137 kt. and assumed the autothrottles were maintaining the speed.” Autothrottles, if armed and turned on, will automatically increase or decrease engine thrust to maintain a preset speed, in this case 137 kt., the reference landing speed for the 777-200ER that day. The NTSB is investigating why the autothrottle did not work as the instructor had expected, an issue that could include mode confusion related to the interaction of various auto-flight modes.
Hersman says investigators documenting switch positions is the cockpit after the crash noted that the autothrottles were armed. In that state, the system will automatically activate when speeds are low regardless of whether pilots have the autothrottle system turned on or off.
Preliminary data from the aircraft’s flight data recorder shows that the speed had already decayed to 134 kt. as the aircraft passed through 500 ft., and would ultimately drop as low as 103 kt. at 3 sec. before impact.
The 777 continued to slow as the pilots attempted to “correct a lateral deviation” as it descended from 500 ft. to 200 ft. “At 200 ft., the four PAPIs were red and the airspeed was in the hatched area,” says Hersman. The “hatched” markings on an airspeed tape warn pilots of an impending stall. The instructor pilot at that point recognized that the autothrottle was not maintaining speed and established a nose-high go-around attitude. He attempted to push the throttles forward for more power, but says the pilot-flying had already done so.
Information from the flight data recorder showed that the pilots first increased engine power from flight idle at 125 ft. altitude, reaching 50% thrust 3 sec. before impact.
The pilots said that after impact, the aircraft “ballooned”, yawed left and went into a 360-degree spin, according to Hersman.
The left-seat pilot was mid-way through the airline’s initial operating experience phase for becoming qualified as a 777 crewmember, a process that requires 20 flights and 60 hr. of flight time with an instructor pilot, according to Hersman. He had completed 10 legs and 35 hr. of flight time.
Hersman says three of the four pilots were on the flight deck at the time of the crash. In addition to the pilot-flying and the instructor pilot, a relief first officer was in the jump seat. The relief captain was in the main cabin. Relief pilots fly the cruise portion of a flight.
This flight was the instructor pilot’s first mission as an instructor pilot, and it was also his first time flying with the left-seat pilot.
Hersman says none of the pilots were given drug or alcohol tests after the accident, a requirement for U.S.-based airline crews but no so for foreign airlines.
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_07_09_2013_p0-595503.xml
It has been extensively reported that the target airspeed(final approach speed) Vref, the landing reference speed was 137kn. Most pilots and airline flight procedures use a Vref +5 company mandated policy, plus in some cases Vref +5, plus 1/2 wind gusts.
Well,,That about does it......i've got no more questions.,
smile, be nice, enjoy life
FB # - 1083
FB # - 1083
strife 0
Either you are entirely wrong, or you are using English words in ways completely differently from most anyone else.
You make it sound like the pilots have to be looking inside the cockpit 100% of the time. Maybe you mean anything above 1% looking inside is "to keep their heads fixed inside", or that it includes checks back and forth from inside to outside. But you aren't using words that anyone else can interpret that way.
As for being "required to monitor" some instrument, well duh, that doesn't mean 100% of the time to the exclusion of all else.
Hopefully, back to the discussion of the accident.
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